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The Impact of China’s New Bankruptcy Law & 
Opportunities for Strategic Operators and 
Financial Investors
Prof. Li Shuguang, China University of Politics and Law
China’s new Bankruptcy Law passed its third review on August 27, 2006, at the 23rd session of the 10th National 
People’s Congress with a high positive 
vote rate. It took effect on June 1, 2007. 
Implementation of the new Bankruptcy 
Law will bring about opportunity and effect 
to strategic investors and financial investors 
at least in the following aspects. 
I. It Applies to All Domestic Legal Person 
Enterprises 
 Compared with the old bankruptcy law 
in trial application from 1986, the new 
Bankruptcy Law expands its legal application 
which is one of its innovations. 
 The old bankruptcy law only applied 
to state–owned enterprises and the new 
Bankruptcy Law, based on the market 
economy principal of equality,  breaks 
through this limitation by including all the 
domestic legal person enterprises such as 
state–owned enterprises, private enterprises 
with legal entity of legal person, three 
types of foreign enterprises incorporated 
in China(joint ventures, joint cooperative 
enterprises, and foreign proprietary 
enterprises),  listed corporations and non-
listed corporations, and even financial 
institutions. Article 135 expands its 
application to other business associations, 
enabling other business associations such 
as partnerships and schools to have legal 
foundation in bankruptcy. 
The new Bankruptcy Law for the first 
time covers transnational bankruptcy: 
“The bankruptcy proceeding filed under 
this law is effective on the debtor’s assets 
located outside of the People’s Republic of 
China.”With the increase of global capital 
flow and transnational investment, related 
bankruptcy judgment will have significant 
influence on creditors or debtors in other 
countries. The new Bankruptcy Law, in 
consideration of this situation, stipulates 
that China’s court shall rule to accept and 
execute a judgment of foreign bankruptcy 
courts on the condition of there existing 
mutual benefit, judicial assistance, or 
international conventions. This provision 
enables domestic enterprises going public 
abroad and foreign enterprises preparing 
to acquire finance in China’s capital market 
to have legal support in case of bankruptcy. 
II. It Stresses the Role of Bankruptcy 
Administrator and Court
The new Bankruptcy Law provides for 
a bankruptcy administrator system and 
creates a new profession which deals with 
bankruptcy affairs professionally. Under 
the new Bankruptcy Law, the liquidation, 
conciliation and reorganization procedure 
shall be managed and operated by 
professionals. In past practice, bankruptcy 
affairs were handled by non-professionals 
and government officials in a strong 
atmosphere of government intervention 
which caused creditor interests to lack 
effective protection. In accordance with 
article 13 of the new Bankruptcy Law 
the court will designate a bankruptcy 
administrator to take over the bankruptcy 
estate and deal with bankruptcy affairs 
upon acceptance of an application for 
bankruptcy. Article 24 provides that the 
post of bankruptcy administrator shall 
be filled by law firms, accounting firms, 
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Dear AIRA Members:
It’s the beginning of a new year, and it will be another active one 
for the Association. The highlight will be our Annual Conference 
in Las Vegas on June 4 – 7, 2008, but there will be plenty of other 
opportunities to network, learn and have some fun all throughout 
the year. 
You may or may not have made New Year’s resolutions for 2008, but 
it’s never too late to add a few more. Consider the following:
• Start the CDBV program to bolster my valuation skills and 
testifying qualifications and to have one less thing that my 
spouse doesn’t understand about me
• Write an article for AIRA Journal and sent it out to all 
of my contacts to remind them about my expertise (and 
what I look like)
• Get current with my CPE requirements so I can continue 
to practice in [insert state name]
• Finish the CIRA exam, and add this meaningful credential 
to my resume (finally!)
• Visit Las Vegas with the hope that what happens in Vegas 
(learning at the Annual Conference) doesn’t stay in 
Vegas
I wish all of our members a happy, healthy and prosperous new 
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Alan Holtz is a Managing Director with AlixPartners based in New York. He has spent close to 
0 years as a corporate restructuring and reorganization specialist and has managed all aspects 
of the financial restructuring process. Alan has provided services to companies, management 
teams and boards of directors, as well as to financial institutions and creditors’ committees, across 
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Letter from the President
AIRA News is published six times a year by the 
Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, 
221 Stewart Avenue, Suite 207, Medford, OR 97501. 
Copyright 2007 by the Association of Insolvency and 
Restructuring Advisors. All rights reserved. No part 
of this newsletter may be reproduced in any form, 
by xerography or otherwise, or incorporated into 
any information retrieval systems, without written 
permission of the copyright owner. 
This publication is designed to provide accurate 
and authoritative information in regard to the subject 
matter covered. It is sold with the understanding 
that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, 
accounting or other professional service. If legal 
or accounting advice or other expert assistance is 
required, the services of a competent professional 
should be sought.
AIRA extends special thanks to these AIRA News 
contributors:
Peter Stenger - Editor
Baxter Dunaway - Section Editor
Jack Williams - Scholar in Residence
Forrest Lewis - Section Editor
Miles Stover - Section Editor
Stacey Schacter - Section Editor 
Jennifer Ginzinger - General Editor
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PBGC Acknowledges AIRA Comments
On December 17, the PBGC issued a final rule1 to amend PBGC’s regulations on 
Premium Rates and Payment of Premiums to implement certain provisions of the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 109–171) and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 
109–280).  The provisions implemented by this rule change the flat premium rate, cap the variable-rate 
premium in some cases, and create a new ‘‘termination premium’’ that is payable in connection with 
certain distress and involuntary plan terminations.  The PBGC acknowledged the comment submitted 
by the AIRA Board based on the proposed rule.  The AIRA Board expressed concern that ‘‘Congress 
may not have considered the financial ramifications of’’ the termination premium. The Board also 
requested that PBGC ‘‘adopt a facts-and circumstance approach in collecting the termination premium 
fee’’ and ‘‘consider limiting its recoveries of this termination premium to amounts that each company 
can afford to pay without jeopardizing its ability to stay in business.’’ 
While the PBGC rejected the AIRA recommendations, it acknowledged that the PBGC has accepted 
less than full payment on its claims for unfunded benefit liabilities, unpaid funding contributions, and 
unpaid flat- and variable-rate premiums in circumstances in which, like other creditors, it has been 
forced to compromise those claims.  Additionally the PBGC acknowledged this practice will continue by 
making the following comment:  “The PBGC recognizes that plan sponsors may face difficult financial 
choices because of the termination premium.  Accordingly, PBGC encourages sponsors that may be 
facing termination premium liability to contact PBGC as early as possible to discuss.”  
The AIRA is grateful to Laura Rosenburg for assisting the Board in its response to the PBGC.
I wish all of you the best for 2008.  As you plan your schedule for 2008, remember the following 
programs (others will be added during the year):
• Valcon Conference, Ft. Lauderdale, FL,  January 14-15, 2008
• AIRA and NYIC Joint Luncheon, New York, NY, January 29, 2008
• 24th Annual Conference, Las Vegas, NV,  June 4-7, 2008
• China Investing and Restructuring Conference, Shanghai, September 2008 
• Advanced Restructuring and Plan of Reorganization Conference, New York, NY,  October 21, 2008 
• Los Angeles Plan of Reorganization and Restructuring Conference (Fall 2008, date TBD)
Best Regards,
 
1   Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 241 / Monday, December 17, 2007 / Rules and Regulations, 71222. 
Executive Director’s Column
Grant W. Newton, CIRA
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     
    
       
        
     
     
    





   
    
  
  
    
 









    
      

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Professor Jack F. Williams, CIRA, CDBV
BANKRUPTCY RETAKES
The Myths of Going Concern 
Valuations
These days business valuations are occupying a lot of court time.  From solvency 
determinations under avoidable preference or fraudulent 
transfer actions to enterprise valuations in contested cram 
down confirmation hearings, courts are confronting an 
array of valuation issues.  Attorneys, financial advisors, 
turnaround managers, and business valuation experts 
are becoming more sophisticated in the developing sub-
discipline of valuing distressed businesses.
Often, the threshold issue in a business valuation is the 
question of whether the target business is a going concern. 
Experts tend to assume a going concern or not, providing very 
little insight or analysis in their expert reports or testimony 
in resolving the issue.  Courts are no more helpful, often 
concluding that a business is or is not a going concern without 
much analysis beyond embracing the colorful but unhelpful 
metaphor that a business is a going concern “unless it is on 
its deathbed.”  Really, what exactly does that phrase mean? 
As a test, the deathbed metaphor is undisciplined, awkward, 
and unhelpful.  To paraphrase Justice Benjamin Cardozo, 
nothing fetters creative thought like a rhythmic refrain.
The determination of whether the target business is or is not a 
going concern will flavor assumptions, tools, and techniques 
employed throughout the business valuation.  For example, 
if the target business is determined to be a going concern 
for insolvency calculation purposes as of the transfer date, 
then the appropriate fair valuation process would generally 
require an asset and liability value somewhere on a continuum 
approximating a fair market value to orderly liquidation 
value.  Moreover, a going concern may have substantial value 
(or not) in both severable (intellectual property licensing 
rights owned by the target company, for example) and 
nonseverable goodwill (for example, the future earning 
potential of the assets in excess of total tangible asset value 
and intangible severable asset value discounted to present 
value).  If the target business is determined not to be a going 
concern, then the appropriate fair valuation process would 
generally require an asset and liability value somewhere 
on a continuum approximating an orderly liquidation to 
straight liquidation value.  In these circumstances, although 
severable goodwill like the right to license a tradename may 
have value, nonseverable goodwill may be severely impaired 
or even nonexistent.
As suggested above, so much in a valuation analysis turns on 
the resolution of the threshold issue of going concern status; 
however, little guidance can be gleaned from authorities.  In 
fact, a perusal of cases that have addressed going concern 
determinations has uncovered several myths. In this column 
I seek to uncover and address those myths.
Myth 1: Going concern is a standard of business valuation
The concept of going concern is not technically a measure 
or standard of valuation at all.  It is an expression of the 
current status of a business.  For example, Certified Public 
Accountants express their opinion on a business’s financial 
statements based on a going concern standard.  A going 
concern is a business that will continue in operation for 
an indefinite period of time.  In contrast, the longevity 
of a business may be in question if it has a negative net 
worth, liquidity or leverage problems, or performance or 
profitability problems.
Thus, the determination that a business is a going concern 
influences the assumptions an expert will make and the 
tools and models employed.  Once a going concern business 
status is determined, the expert will generally employ 
robust income and market approaches with the continuing 
business assumption embedded in the model.  This status 
determination generally requires that an expert determine 
the enterprise value of a business.  It does not mean that it is 
inappropriate to use an adjusted balance sheet approach if 
the Bankruptcy Code requires it, for example, in the context 
of a preference action under sections 547(b).  Borrowing 
from the well reasoned commentary to SOP 90-7, an expert 
would determine the value of the company, compare that 
value to total tangible assets and intangible severable goodwill 
adjusted to fair value (collectively, “total asset value”); if the 
value of the business is greater than the total asset value 
as adjusted, then you have positive nonseverable goodwill 
that you would book as an entry on the fair value adjusted 
balance sheet.
We generally approach the determination of going concern 
as a bivalent one, a binary set – a business is either a going 
concern or it is not.  Yet, experts have recognized in related 
fields that status is actually multivalent; that is, there are 
actually more than two outcomes to the determination of 
business status.  In our field, business status is best understood 
as a continuum of conditions ranging from going concern 
to failed concern, the labels we attach to both termini. 
Technically, status may be understood as a vector of business 
conditions from going concern (growing) to going concern 
(static) to going concern (declining) to failing concern to 
failed concern.  Our cases tend to truncate the determination, 
then, by concluding that either one or the other extreme is 
applicable.  To be sure, the truncating (or rounding off) of 
business status is not unreasonable; however, that approach 
does not use all the relevant facts and paints a less than robust 
picture of the business condition.  Therefore, a business 
valuation driven by a better understanding of what business 
status actually measures helps us account for the reality that 
not all going concerns are equal.
AIRA Scholar in Residence
AIRA Journal Vol. 1  No. 5   December/January  008  
My experience also suggests that as valuations become more 
commonplace and courts mature as they confront this and 
related issues, we will begin to experience more courts 
embracing a bifurcated approach to valuations.  I suggest 
that we should witness a movement to where valuation 
issues, such as insolvency in an avoidance action, will be 
tried in two phases:  (1) the business determination phase 
and (2) the valuation phase.  It should not surprise us that 
business determinations often masquerade as valuation 
determinations.  What I mean by this is that many expert 
disputes on valuation are actually disputes of business status 
determinations.  For example, the plaintiff’s expert in a 
fraudulent transfer action under section 548 has opined that 
the debtor was insolvent as of the transfer date, employing 
a liquidation analysis, an analysis that assumes a failed or 
failing business.  In contrast, the defendant’s expert has 
opined that the debtor was solvent as of the transfer date, 
employing an enterprise value assessment of the debtor, an 
analysis that assumes a going concern.  In reality, we would 
probably see that both experts would be close to agreement 
on the underlying valuation if given a business condition; 
that is, the experts would find their opinions relatively close 
if they both employed a failed business assumption or a going 
concern assumption.  Our present trial control models fail 
to appreciate the economies of bifurcating the valuation 
process.  The bifurcation model is even more compelling 
in the contested confirmation scenario where the estate 
will pay the tab of competing experts that were retained by 
the debtor, the creditor’s committee, and possibly an equity 
committee.  Why put the estate to the expense of full-blown 
valuation opinions, expert reports, depositions, and trial 
testimony among several experts before a court finding on 
the status of the business?
Myth 2: A business is a going concern unless it fails 
tomorrow
As mentioned, several valuation cases appear to have a 
pre-occupation with the phrase “deathbed” in referring 
to when a going concern analysis is not appropriate for a 
distressed business.  Although the term is quite colorful, 
it has little practical analytical significance.  The deathbed 
metaphor suggests that business death most be imminent, 
like, let’s say tomorrow.  This approach collapses business 
status determinations into two phases – going concern and 
tantamount to dead.  So, under this approach, what would 
we do with a business that will not make the week?  Month? 
Next business cycle?  Year?  Two Years?
Some courts have struggled with the limiting deathbed word 
picture.  Thus, cases embrace temporal standards to assess 
the appropriate business status, like “liquidation value is 
appropriate, however, if at the time in question the business 
is so close to shutting its doors that a going concern standard 
is unrealistic,”1 or like “liquidation was clearly imminent.”2 
1 Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, 
Inc.), 100 B.R. 127, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
2 Wolkowitz v. American Research Corp. (In re DAK Industries, Inc.), 
195 B.R. 117, 125 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 170 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 
1999)
A review of the better-reasoned cases suggests that the 
proper analytical frame of reference is to assess whether it is 
more likely than not that the business will fail within the reasonably 
foreseeable future.3  I would suggest that the appropriate 
temporal reference would be within a year, thus, including, 
in most circumstances, at least one business cycle.
Myth 3: If a business is a going concern, then it must be 
solvent
I have been unsuccessful in determining where this myth 
began.  I suspect this is an outgrowth of the deathbed 
metaphor.  The thought process goes like this:  the business 
is not dead today, is not dying tomorrow, and should survive 
the week; therefore, the business is a going concern and 
because it is a going concern, it must be solvent.  Granted, I 
exaggerate, but only to prove my point.  Once we determine 
that the business is a going concern, we then employ the 
appropriate tools and models to determine whether a 
business is solvent.  Under this myth, I would add the 
statements I have heard in courts that because businesses sell 
in bankruptcy all the time at some positive value, businesses 
are generally solvent.  Come on!  Business assets are sold 
in bankruptcy all the time for positive value stripped of the 
debt that once encumbered them!  A solvency analysis always 
requires a comparison of assets and liabilities at some level 
of abstraction.  Positive asset value presents one side of the 
equation; however, an appropriate model must allow the 
trier of fact to compare assets and liabilities at some level of 
abstraction.
This is one of my favorite myths in that the myth uncovers the 
very human nature of judges and practitioners.  Authorities 
are unanimous in that one determines value as of a given 
date.  That date is usually tied to some event, for example, 
a transfer date, an obligation date, the petition date, 
confirmation date, effective date, etc.  Thus, courts warn us 
that hindsight is irrelevant and, in fact, confuses the issue. 
Yet, experts and courts alike use hindsight all the time.  For 
example, experts have testified and courts have observed 
that if a business continues to operate after the relevant date, 
then it must have been a going concern as of that relevant 
date.  That is hindsight, plain and simple.
Let me offer up two examples where hindsight would lead 
to the wrong conclusion.  In the first case, let us assume a 
business is in a precarious financial condition in January 
20XX.  The business plan is failing and customer contracts 
are drying up.  The business may be able to operate a month 
or two at the most and would then have to liquidate.  A 
transfer is made in February 20XX.  Later that month, the 
business is awarded a new, unexpected contract by one of 
its competitor’s customers because of a fire suffered by its 
competitor.  The contract is large enough that it keeps the 
business operating for another 18 months.  In 20X1, the 
business files a bankruptcy petition.  The creditor’s committee 
3 See Frank R. Kennedy, Vern Countryman & Jack F. Williams, PART-
NERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES & S CORPORATIONS 
IN BANKRUPTCY chs. 6 and 13 (2000)(and cases cited therein).
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brings an action to attack the transfer 
as fraudulent and seeks to show the 
business was insolvent in February 
20XX.
Based on the facts and circumstances as 
known or as reasonably knowable, as of 
the transfer date, it appeared that the 
business was not a going concern and 
that liquidation would be necessary 
within the year.  But an unforeseeable 
subsequent event occurred.  The fact 
that a competitor suffered a fire, thus 
forcing its customers to seek cover 
from others like the business, was not 
known or knowable at the time of 
the transfer, the relevant date.  To be 
sure, businesses catch fire, but that 
fact does not make the subsequent fire 
reasonably known.  Subsequent events, 
like the new contract or continued 
operations, should be ignored.
In the second case, let us assume 
a business that is financially stable 
with modest but sustained growth.  A 
transfer is made in February 20XX. 
Later that year, a terrorist attack occurs 
that negatively impacts the market 
segment, causing all businesses to begin 
to lose money at an alarming rate.  In 
20X1, the business files a bankruptcy 
petition.    The creditor’s committee 
brings an action to attack the transfer 
as fraudulent and seeks to show the 
business was insolvent in February 
20XX.
Based on the facts and circumstances as 
known or knowable, as of the transfer 
date, the business appears to be a going 
concern.  Again, an unforeseeable 
subsequent event occurred.  The fact 
that a terrorist attack harmed the 
relevant market segment was not known 
or knowable at the time of the transfer. 
The subsequent terrorist event and 
the failure of the business should be 
ignored.
In summary, in both instances, 
subsequent events that are not known 
or knowable, based on the facts and 
circumstances, should be ignored. 
Often, one of those subsequent events 
is the continuation or failure of a 
business after the transfer date.
Conclusion 
The developing body of law on valuations 
is impressive in both number and 
thought.  Courts have been developing 
a level of understanding and maturity 
that is quite impressive.  Attorneys and 
experts have also developed a more 
sophisticated approach to valuations, 
often prodded by well meaning judges 
intent on “trying to get it right.” 
However, one area where we all might 
be falling down is in the threshold 
determination of business status.  We 
acknowledge that business status is 
important if not critical to any business 
valuation; nonetheless, we regularly see 
(with notable exceptions) little analysis 
by experts, weak argument by counsel, 
and abbreviated discussion by courts. 
We bankruptcy academics are not 
immune from this criticism; we usually 
ignore it altogether.  I find all this 
peculiar in light of the role business 
determination plays in valuation.  As 
we all mature in the distressed business 
valuation discipline, let us commit 
ourselves to a more careful development 
of business status determinations and 
slay the myths forever.  
...come extraordinary solutions.
With the right skills and resources... 
*Interim Management services provided by Mesirow Financial Interim Management, LLC. Mesirow Financial Consulting, LLC is an Illinois limited liability corporation. The Mesirow
Financial name and logo are registered service marks of Mesirow Financial Holdings, Inc. © 2008 Mesirow Financial Holdings, Inc. All rights reserved.
For more information, please contact: consulting@mesirowfinancial.com / 877-632-4200
Combining industry and functional expertise, Mesirow Financial Consulting provides you with the high-
quality attention you need — when and where you need it. We offer specialized expertise on a national and
local level to quickly assess complex situations and provide seasoned advice across a broad range of
restructuring and related matters.
New York  • Chicago 
Boston  • Charlotte  • Dallas  • Houston  • Los Angeles  • Miami
• Valuation Services
• Operations and Performance Improvement
• Other Consulting Services
• Corporate Recovery
• Litigation and Investigative Services
• Interim Management*
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Recent court opinions created a stir in the collection industry by challenging debt collectors’ procedures for recovering money. While nearly everyone agrees 
that debt collectors need strict regulation to prevent strong-
arm tactics, the courts’ recent rulings left many legitimate 
companies wondering how to comply with state and federal 
regulations.
Nearly 30 years ago, Congress passed the FDCPA to curb 
abusive collection practices and provide a legal remedy 
for victims of those abuses. Unfortunately, the FDCPA has 
not stayed current with the times, and courts have not 
clarified the Act’s language to reflect today’s technology. 
The resulting confusion yields a number of traps that leave 
ethical collectors exposed to heavy penalties.
In fact, the FDCPA’s strict liability standard created a cottage 
industry of “Debtor’s Rights” attorneys, who seek to enforce 
the Act’s stiff penalties for even trivial violations. These 
attorneys, who often threaten suit if they are not paid a quick 
settlement, know that the cost of defending FDCPA claims 
can easily reach $10,000 or more.
Moreover, if the debtor prevails, the Act requires the 
collector to pay the debtor’s attorneys’ fees and costs, even 
if the fees exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s damages. 
In these instances, the debtors’ attorneys understand that 
the collectors’ legal costs in defending such actions would 
exceed the cost of a quick settlement. 
Many collectors fall prey to lawsuits or threats based on 
ambiguities in FDCPA’s treatment of voice messages, which 
many professionals believe makes it impossible for a collector 
to leave a message without violating the FDCPA. The FDCPA 
allows collectors to make telephone calls to communicate 
with debtors, and it is generally understood that these calls 
help all parties because they allow debtors to work out 
payment plans (where possible), and discuss the resolution 
of claims without the need for lawsuits, wage garnishments, 
foreclosures or other legal process. Unfortunately, recent 
decisions interpreting the FDCPA call into question whether 
collectors can leave any voice message without opening 
themselves up to significant penalties. 
For example, the FDCPA requires collectors to identify 
themselves and to state that they are calling to collect a 
debt, a process many courts refer to as the “Mini-Miranda 
Warning.” The law also generally requires collectors to 
refrain from communicating with third parties about the 
debt. While these requirements appear reasonable on the 
surface, they are incompatible when collectors encounter 
a debtor’s answering machine because the collector may 
end up violating the Act regardless if they leave the Mini-
Miranda. Courts have consistently held that a collector who 
omits the warning violates the FDCPA. At the same time, 
if the collector provides the Mini-Miranda, he or she risks 
violating the FDCPA if the debtor’s spouse or some other 
third party overhears the message. 
The FDCPA was enacted in 1977 at a time when answering 
machines were not widely used and voicemail was not yet 
invented. Unfortunately, courts interpreting the Act have not 
addressed these deficiencies in their decisions, and Congress 
has not updated the law. As a result, many collectors respond 
to this problem by refraining from leaving messages. While 
this tactic ensures that the collector will not leave improper 
messages, it also dramatically impedes communications and 
eliminates opportunities for agreement. The Association of 
Credit and Collection Professionals, an agency representing 
the collections industry, recommends that its collectors use 
the Mini-Miranda warning, but preface their messages by 
stating, “This is a call for [debtor’s name]. If you are not 
[debtor’s name], please hang up immediately.” Nonetheless, 
no court has approved the language, and a court could still 
find a collector liable if a third party continued to listen. 
The risks of significant damages under the FDCPA are very 
real. Without a clear path to avoid liability, debt collectors 
who leave voicemails may face lawsuits alleging significant 
damages for comparatively trivial debts. In one situation, a 
debtor tried to recover up to a half million dollars from a 
debt collector who made repeated phone calls to the debtor 
trying to collect student loans. In another case, a debtor 
recovered several thousand dollars for emotional distress 
when a debt collector tried to recover less than $300. 
The current uncertainty surrounding FDCPA liability for 
leaving voice messages may have a significant impact on the 
business community as a whole. Debt collectors are not a 
particularly popular or sympathetic segment of the business 
community; however, most business professionals agree that 
collectors enable financial institutions to keep lending rates 
low and more capital available. As a result of the FDCPA’s 
ambiguity, many collectors force their clients to make a 
choice regarding future collection methods. Businesses may 
choose between paying debt collectors higher costs to offset 
FDCPA risks for the continued efficiency of collections using 
voice messages, or less effective, yet safer collection methods 
without using voicemail. In either event, until the courts or 
Congress clarifies the proper method for leaving a collection 
voice message, the consumer ultimately loses.   
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Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq., applies to 
bankruptcy cases commenced on or 
after October 17, 2005.  While Chapter 15 was enacted over 
two years ago, relatively few cases have invoked the power 
it grants to bankruptcy courts. In cases where Chapter 15 
has been invoked, common issues and themes are present. 
This paper discusses the issues that have been litigated in 
reported decisions under Chapter 15.
1. Cases Concerning the “Center of Main Interests” and 
“Establishment” Tests
One aspect of Chapter 15 that has been the subject of 
litigation is whether a foreign insolvency proceeding qualifies 
as either a foreign “main” or “nonmain” proceeding.  While 
broad relief is available in either “main” or “nonmain” 
proceedings, recognition as a foreign “main” proceeding 
provides the debtor immediately with the benefit of the 
automatic stay, and allows the foreign representative to 
operate any of the debtor’s businesses located in the 
United States.  11 U.S.C. § 1520.  There are three reported 
decisions, discussed below, addressing whether a case should 
be considered “main,” “nonmain” or neither:  (i) In re Tri 
Continental Exchange, Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 11, 2006) (“Tri-Continental”) (Klein, Bankruptcy Judge), 
where the court determined that the foreign proceedings 
were foreign “main” proceedings, (ii) In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 
B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (“SPhinX Funds”) 
(Drain, Bankruptcy Judge), aff’d 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(Sweet, District Judge), where the court determined that the 
foreign proceedings were not foreign “main” proceedings 
but were entitled to “nonmain” status; and (iii) In re Bear 
Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage 
Master Fund, Ltd., Case Nos. 07-12383, 07-12384, 2007 WL 
2683661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007) (“Bear Stearns”) 
(Lifland, Bankruptcy Judge), appeal docketed (Sept. 10, 2007), 
where the court determined that the foreign proceedings 
were not entitled to either status. 
In Tri-Continental, supra, the debtors (collectively, “Tri-
Continental”) were the subject of joint liquidations or 
winding-up proceedings under the laws of St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines.  Before the proceedings were commenced, 
Tri-Continental had been in the business of selling insurance 
policies to insureds located in the United States and Canada. 
Tri-Continental, 349 B.R. at 629.  Tri-Continental’s business 
model was to provide “greatly reduced rates to industries that 
are difficult to insure, such as taxi drivers, truckers, roofers, 
bars, restaurants, and clubs.”  Id. at 630.  Tri-Continental was 
registered to do business in St. Vincent.
Tri-Continental perpetrated an insurance fraud: while it 
collected premiums, claims against the insurance policies 
went unpaid and the company’s assets 
were secreted away.   Id.   Criminal 
prosecutions were launched and, 
eventually, insolvency and winding-
up proceedings were commenced in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  Thereafter, Tri-Continental’s court-appointed 
Joint Provisional Liquidators commenced Chapter 15 
proceedings in the United States and sought recognition of 
the proceedings pending in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
as “foreign main proceedings.”  Id. at 631-32.  A U.S.-based 
judgment creditor, Bennett Truck Transport LLC (“Bennett 
Truck”), objected, contending that the foreign proceedings 
were “nonmain” and seeking additional relief in the nature 
of restrictions on the transfer of Tri-Continental’s assets 
located in the United States.  Id. at 631.
A “foreign main proceeding” is an insolvency proceeding 
in the foreign country in which the debtor has its “center 
of main interests.”  11 U.S.C. § 1502(4).  While the phrase 
“center of main interests” was a new concept to U.S. 
courts (incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code through 
Chapter 15), it had been used in some European laws, so 
in determining where Tri-Continental’s “center of main 
interests” was located, the court looked to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on cross border insolvency for guidance.  Tri-
Continental, 349 B.R. at 633-34.  In taking that approach to 
statutory interpretation, the court noted that use of the term 
“center of main interests” was “intentionally designed to 
promote international uniformity.”  Id.  The “main” versus 
“nonmain” concept adopted under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, in turn, was modeled on the same concept embodied in 
the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 
(the “EU Convention”).  Id.  The regulations implementing 
the EU Convention reveal that the “center of main interests” 
concept relates to “the place where the debtor conducts 
the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is 
therefore ascertainable by third parties.”  Id. at 634 (citations 
omitted).  
With these principles in mind, the Tri-Continental bankruptcy 
court concluded that the phrase “center of main interests” in 
Chapter 15 “generally equates with the concept of ‘principal 
place of business’ in United States law.”  Id.  The court also 
noted that this conclusion is consistent with section 1516(c) 
of Chapter 15, which provides that in the absence of other 
evidence, the location of a debtor’s “registered office” is 
presumptively its center of main interests.  Id. at 635.  The 
foreign representative bears the burden of demonstrating 
where the center of main interests lies.  Id.
The Tri-Continental court found that the debtors’ registered 
offices were in St. Vincent, and that the debtors “conducted 
regular business operations” there “in a manner that equates 
with a ‘principal place of business’ under concepts of United 
States law.”  Id. at 629.  Thus, despite the fact that the 
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insurance policies were sold to, and an 
insurance scam was perpetrated upon, 
U.S. and Canadian policyholders, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines were found 
to be the “center of main interests” and 
the proceedings in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines were recognized as “foreign 
main” proceedings under Chapter 15. 
Id. at 629.
After determining that the foreign 
proceedings would be granted 
foreign “main” proceeding status, 
the bankruptcy court denied Bennett 
Truck’s request for provisional 
relief.  Bennett Truck had asked the 
bankruptcy court to impose transfer 
restrictions on approximately $1.6 
million in funds recovered by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, over which 
funds the Joint Provisional Liquidators 
sought to obtain control.  Id. at 636. 
Bennett Truck was concerned that 
these funds – upon which it claimed a 
lienholder interest – would be used to 
pay the Joint Provisional Liquidators’ 
fees before Bennett Truck’s claims 
were paid.  Id. at 635-36.  However, in 
denying Bennett Truck’s request, the 
court noted that the Joint Provisional 
Liquidators sought only the authority 
to administer assets under section 
1521(a)(5), not the authority to 
distribute assets under section 1521(b). 
Id. at 636.  Thus, while recognizing that 
“Chapter 15 provides ample authority 
for [the bankruptcy court] to impose 
restrictions so as to protect United 
States creditors to a greater extent than 
otherwise provided in Chapter 15 and 
in other applicable provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code,” the court found 
that the provisional relief sought by 
Bennett Truck was unnecessary.  Id. at 
629, 636.
Another case involving analysis of a 
debtor’s “center of main interests” and 
whether a foreign proceeding should 
be considered “main” or “nonmain” 
under Chapter 15 is SPhinX Funds, 
supra.  In that case, the bankruptcy and 
district courts found that the foreign 
proceedings were entitled to “nonmain” 
status only.  SPhinX Funds, 351 B.R. at 
122, aff’d 371 B.R. at 10.  The debtors in 
the Chapter 15 proceedings were hedge 
funds based in the Cayman Islands 
(the “SPhinX Funds”), but they had 
no employees or physical offices there; 
rather, the SPhinX Funds’ business was 
conducted by a Delaware corporation 
located in New York.  SPhinX Funds, 351 
B.R. at 107-8.
Before the collapse of the SPhinX 
Funds, Refco Capital Markets, Inc. 
(“RCM”), a creditor of the SPhinX 
Funds and itself a debtor in U.S.-based 
bankruptcy proceedings, commenced 
a $312 million preference action in 
RCM’s bankruptcy case against the 
SPhinX Funds.  Id. at 108-9.  RCM 
and the SPhinX Funds entered into 
a settlement, which required court 
approval in RCM’s bankruptcy case. 
Id. at 109.  Some SPhinX investors, 
however, opposed the settlement, on 
the grounds that it paid too much to 
RCM.  Id.  Shortly before the hearing 
for approval of the settlement, 
these SPhinX investors commenced 
involuntary “winding up” proceedings 
(the “First Winding-Up Proceedings”) 
for two of the SPhinX Funds in the 
Cayman Islands, and Joint Provisional 
Liquidators were appointed.  Id.
At the hearing on the RCM settlement, 
the Joint Provisional Liquidators 
notified the bankruptcy court that 
the First Winding-Up Proceedings 
had been commenced.  Id.  The Joint 
Provisional Liquidators also petitioned 
for recognition under Chapter 15 and 
requested that the hearing on approval 
of the settlement between RCM and 
the SPhinX Funds be adjourned so 
that they could have time to evaluate 
whether the settlement was fair to 
the SPhinX Funds (not whether the 
settlement was fair to RCM or its 
creditors or bankruptcy estate).  Id. 
The bankruptcy court denied this 
request because the issue before the 
court was not whether the settlement 
was fair to the SPhinX Funds; rather, 
the issue before the court was whether 
the settlement was fair to RCM and its 
estate.  Id. at 109-10.  The settlement was 
approved.  Id. at 110.
After the settlement was approved, 
the First Winding-Up proceedings in 
the Cayman Islands were dismissed 
against one fund and adjourned 
against another, and the Chapter 15 
petition withdrawn.  Id.  Not deterred, 
several SPhinX investors appealed 
the order approving the settlement, 
which blocked implementation of the 
settlement because the settlement was 
not effective until entry of a final order 
not subject to appeal.  Id.  These investors 
then gained control over the SPhinX 
Funds, and commenced voluntary 
liquidation proceedings in the Cayman 
Islands (the “Second Winding-Up 
Proceedings”).  Id.  Once appointed, 
the Joint Voluntary Liquidators (i) 
made appearances in the settlement 
appeal and (ii) sought foreign “main” 
proceeding status (presumably because 
the automatic stay would apply and 
the RCM settlement would arguably 
continue to be stayed).  Id. at 110-11. 
The Joint Voluntary Liquidators also 
attempted to enjoin all further activity 
on the appeal, again arguing that 
they needed time to investigate the 
propriety of the settlement from the 
SPhinX Funds’ perspective. Id. at 111. 
This request was denied and the appeal 
proceeded.1  Id.  
The SPhinX Funds’ “center of main 
interests” was presumptively in the 
Cayman Islands, that being the location 
of their registered office.  Id. at 117. 
The bankruptcy court noted, however, 
that this statutory presumption 
could be rebutted and that it was of 
less weight when there was a serious 
dispute over primacy.  Id.  With respect 
to the showing that must be made to 
overcome the statutory presumption, 
the court stated:
Various factors, singly or 
combined, could be relevant 
to such a determination:  
the location of the debtor’s 
headquarters; the location of 
those who actually manage the 
debtors (which conceivably 
could be the headquarters of a 
holding company); the location 
of the debtor’s primary assets; 
the location of the majority of the 
debtor’s creditors or a majority 
of the creditors who would be 
affected by the case; and/or the 
jurisdiction whose law would 
apply to most disputes.
Id.  The court also stated that 
“[b]ecause their money is ultimately 
at stake, one generally should defer 
1 The complicated procedural history of the 
SPhinX Funds case played an important role in 
the bankruptcy court’s ultimate holding that 
the foreign proceedings would be recognized 
as “nonmain” proceedings only.  
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. . . to the creditors’ acquiescence in or 
support of a proposed [‘center of main 
interests.’]”  Id.  
In determining that the SPhinX Funds’ 
“center of main interests” was not the 
Cayman Islands, the court pointed to 
“important objective factors.”  Id. at 119 
(emphasis supplied).  These factors 
included the fact that “as far as the 
administration of the Debtors’ business 
[was] concerned, the SPhinX Funds’ 
hedge fund business was conducted . . . 
outside of the Cayman Islands, as were 
most of the SPhinX Funds’ back-office 
operations.”  Id.  Also, there “were no 
employees or managers in the Cayman 
Islands, and the Debtors’ boards, which 
contained no Cayman Islands residents, 
never met in the Cayman Islands.” 
Id.  In addition, the court found that 
“pragmatic considerations affecting the 
Debtors’ cases” also supported a finding 
that the “center of main interests” 
was not in the Cayman Islands.  Id. 
(Emphasis supplied).  None of the 
Funds’ assets (other than corporate 
minute books and similar records) 
were in the Cayman Islands and the 
Joint Voluntary Liquidators would 
have to seek the assistance of foreign, 
not Cayman Island, courts in order to 
administer those assets.  Id.  Moreover, 
“most, if not all [of the Funds’] creditors 
and investors [were] located outside of 
the Cayman Islands[.]”  Id.  
Despite all of these factors weighing in 
favor of finding that the SPhinX Funds’ 
“center of main interests” should not 
be in the Cayman Islands, the court 
stated that standing alone, these 
factors ordinarily might not be enough 
to overcome the statutory presumption 
because the Funds’ creditors and 
investors had acquiesced to a finding 
that the “center of main interests” was, 
in fact, in the Cayman Islands.  Id. at 
120-21.  One additional consideration, 
however, was critical to the bankruptcy 
court’s finding that the statutory 
presumption had been overcome:
[A] primary basis for the Petition 
[for recognition as a foreign 
main proceeding], and the 
investors’ tacit consent to the 
Cayman Islands proceedings 
as foreign main proceedings, 
is improper:  that is, it has the 
purpose of frustrating the RCM 
Settlement by obtaining a stay of 
the appeals upon the invocation 
of Bankruptcy Code section 
362(a) that would go into effect 
under section 1520(a)(1) upon 
such recognition.
Id. at 121.  The court stated that “this 
litigation strategy appears to be the 
only reason for [the Joint Voluntary 
Liquidators’] request for recognition 
of the Cayman Islands proceedings 
as foreign main proceedings” and 
that this “strategy taint[ed] the [Joint 
Voluntary Liquidators’] request and 
the investors’ consent to it, giving the 
clear appearance of improper forum 
shopping.”  Id.  Accordingly, only 
foreign “nonmain” status was granted. 
Id. at 122.  The bankruptcy court’s 
ruling was upheld on appeal by the 
district court.  In re SPhinX, Ltd., 371 
B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).2
The most recent decision regarding 
this issue is Bankruptcy Judge Lifland’s 
decision in Bear Stearns, supra, which 
involved two Bear Stearns investment 
funds (the “Funds”).  Both Funds 
were Cayman Islands limited liability 
companies with registered offices in the 
Cayman Islands.  Id. at *1.  Much like 
the case in  SPhinX Funds, however, the 
Bear Stearns Funds were administered 
in the U.S. by a U.S. corporation, and 
the Funds’ asset manager was located 
in New York (as were the assets it 
managed).  Id.
On July 31, 2007, each of the Funds 
caused winding-up proceedings to be 
commenced in the Cayman Islands, and 
voluntary Joint Provisional Liquidators 
were appointed.  Thereafter, the Joint 
Provisional Liquidators filed Chapter 15 
petitions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of New York, 
seeking recognition of the Cayman 
Islands proceedings as foreign “main” 
proceedings or, in the alternative, as 
foreign “nonmain” proceedings.  Id. at 
*1-2.
In its analysis, the court recognized that 
“Chapter 15 accords the court substantial 
discretion and flexibility,” but also 
2 A separate issue noted in the bankruptcy 
court’s decision is that the statutory language 
permits a finding that a foreign proceeding is 
“nonmain” even when there would otherwise 
not be a “main” proceeding pending in any 
court.  SPhinX Funds, 351 B.R. at 122.  
noted that “the process of recognition 
of a foreign proceeding is a simple 
single step process incorporating the 
definitions in section 1502 and 101(23) 
and (24) to determine recognition as 
either a main or nonmain proceeding 
or nonrecognition.”  Id. at *3 (emphasis 
supplied) (citations omitted).  While 
the Funds were registered in the 
Cayman Islands, the court denied 
foreign “main” status.  Id. at *6.  In 
doing so, the court emphasized that 
the Funds had “no employees or 
managers in the Cayman Islands,” that 
“the investment manager . . . is located 
in New York, the Administrator that 
runs the back-office operations of the 
Funds is in the United States along 
with the Funds’ books and records” 
and that prior to the Cayman Islands 
proceeding having been commenced, 
“all of the Funds’ liquid assets were 
in the United States.”  Id.  The court 
also noted the location of investors and 
the application of U.S. law as relevant 
to its analysis.  Id.  Considering these 
factors, the court found the statutory 
presumption had been overcome, even 
though no creditor had objected to 
foreign “main” status being granted. 
Id.3
The court also denied foreign 
“nonmain” status.  Id. at *7.  Section 
1502(5) defines a “foreign nonmain 
proceeding” as “a foreign proceeding, 
other than a foreign main proceeding, 
pending in a country where the debtor 
has an establishment.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1502(5).  The court focused on the 
“establishment” requirement and 
reasoned that in order to qualify for 
nonmain status, the Funds needed 
to conduct “nontransitory economic 
activity” in the Cayman Islands.  In other 
words, the Funds had to have “a local 
place of business” in the Cayman Islands 
in order for the foreign proceedings to 
qualify even for “nonmain” status.  Id. 
(Emphasis in original).4  In this analysis, 
3 Judge Lifland made clear that recognition of 
the foreign insolvency proceeding was not to 
be “rubber stamped” in a Chapter 15 case and 
that the facts should be reviewed independent-
ly, even in the absence of an objection.  Bear 
Stearns, 2007 WL 2479483 at *6.  
4 Judge Lifland’s conclusions with respect to 
both the “center of main interests” and “es-
tablishment” of the Debtors being outside the 
Cayman Islands have been challenged by the 
Joint Provisional Liquidators in an appeal to 
the District Court.  Bear Stearns, Docket No. 29 
(Statement of Issues on Appeal, filed Septem-
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the court said “the bar is rather high,” 
and determined that there was “no 
(pertinent) nontransitory economic 
activity conducted locally in the Cayman 
Islands by the Funds; only those activities 
necessary to their offshore ‘business.’” 
Id.  As a result, foreign nonmain status 
was denied.  Id.5  
In denying nonmain status, the court 
recognized that its decision conflicted 
with the SPhinX Funds decisions of both 
the bankruptcy and district courts, but 
also commented that neither of the 
SPhinX Funds decisions addressed the 
“establishment” requirement of section 
1502(5) before granting foreign 
“nonmain” status.  Id.  The court also 
rejected arguments based on cases 
decided under former section 304 
(repealed).  Id. at *8.  The court stated 
that, as compared with former section 
304:
Chapter 15 . . . imposes a 
rigid procedural structure 
for recognition of foreign 
proceedings as either main 
or nonmain and thus the 
jurisprudence developed under 
section 304 is of no assistance in 
determining the issues relating to 
the presumption for recognition 
under chapter 15.
Id.  
In its conclusion, the court commented 
that “[n]onrecognition of the Foreign 
Proceedings . . . does not leave the 
[Joint Provisional Liquidators] without 
the ability to obtain relief from U.S. 
courts,” citing Bankruptcy Code sections 
303(b)(4) and 1509(f).  Id.  However, in a 
footnote, the court called into question 
whether relief is, in fact, available to a 
foreign representative under section 
303(b)(4).  The court stated:  “It would 
appear that the failure to repeal section 
303(b)(4) along with section 304 may 
be a drafting error in view of the newly 
enacted section 1511(b) which likewise 
ber 20, 2007).  As of the writing of this paper, 
the Joint Provisional Liquidators are seeking a 
stay pending a ruling on the appeal.
5 In an even more recent Chapter 15 case, In re 
Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), Case No. 07-
12762 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Gerber, Bankruptcy 
Judge), Judge Gerber has asked the parties to 
address the issues raised in the Bear Stearns de-
cision at a hearing on recognition scheduled 
for November 19, 2007. 
addresses the commencement of a 
case under sections 301 and 303.  The 
inconsistencies of the two statutes have 
not been conformed.”  Id. at *8, n.15. 
How courts will resolve this issue, to the 
extent it is found to exist, remains to 
be seen.6
Tri-Continental, SPhinX Funds and Bear 
Stearns came to different conclusions 
as to whether foreign proceedings were 
“main,” “nonmain” or neither.  Tri-
Continental focused on where the debtor 
had its registered office and conducted 
its business operations in concluding 
that proceedings in St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines would be recognized as 
foreign “main” proceedings.  In Sphinx 
Funds, the bankruptcy court focused 
on the debtor’s registered place of 
business and the consent of creditors 
and investors to foreign “main” status 
being granted, but ultimately denied 
such status since it was being sought 
for “an improper purpose.”  Finally, 
in Bear Stearns, the bankruptcy court 
refused to grant either foreign “main” 
or “nonmain” status.  Clearly, this is an 
area of Chapter 15 jurisprudence that 
will continue to evolve.  
2. Cases Involving Procedural Issues
The Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy 
Rules provide specific procedures 
for seeking the various kinds of relief 
available under Chapter 15.  Despite 
these detailed provisions, questions 
have arisen as to how relief can be 
obtained and whether case law decided 
prior to Chapter 15’s effective date 
remains applicable.
The decision in United States v. J.A. 
Jones Constr. Group, LLC, 333 B.R. 637 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2005) (“J.A. Jones”) 
(Go, U.S. Magistrate), addressed 
procedural deficiencies in a request 
for assistance made during the course 
of a U.S.-based litigation by an Interim 
Receiver in a Canadian insolvency 
proceeding.  The U.S.-based litigation 
was a district court breach of contract 
6 Judge Lifland’s point appears to be supported 
by the legislative history of Chapter 15.  See 
H.R. Rep. 109-31, pt. 1 at 105-06 (2005), as re-
printed in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 169, 174 (“In any 
case, an order granting recognition is required 
as a prerequisite to the use of sections 301 and 
303 by a foreign representative.”).  Collier’s 
agrees.  8 Collier on BankruptCy ¶ 1511.01 (15th 
ed. revised 2007). 
action where one of the defendants was 
a subsidiary of a company involved in 
Canadian insolvency proceedings.  J. A. 
Jones, 333 B.R. at 637-38.  In the district 
court litigation, the Interim Receiver for 
the corporate parent of this defendant 
sought a stay of the litigation.  Id. at 638. 
The procedure by which the Interim 
Receiver sought a stay, however, was 
by way of simply submitting a letter 
request to the district court in the 
pending litigation.  Id. at 637-38.  The 
stay which the Interim Receiver sought 
was to the same extent that a stay was 
available under Canadian bankruptcy 
law.  Id. at 638.
The district court denied the stay 
sought by the Interim Receiver, largely 
on procedural grounds.  Analyzing the 
request under Chapter 15, the court 
recognized that the “[t]he minimal 
requirements” of Chapter 15 “were 
‘designed to make recognition [of 
foreign proceedings] as simple and 
expedient as possible.’”  Id. at 639 
(citing legislative history).  However, 
the court found that under Chapter 
15, the relief  sought by the Receiver 
“is available only after a foreign 
representative commences an ancillary 
proceeding for recognition of a foreign 
proceeding before a bankruptcy court.” 
Id. at 638.  
Because the Receiver filed only a letter 
request with the district court in the 
already- pending litigation matter, 
and did not commence the necessary 
ancillary proceeding under Chapter 
15, the district court denied the 
request, stating:  “[i]n the absence of 
recognition under [C]hapter 15, this 
Court has no authority to consider [the 
Receiver’s] request for a stay.  Id. at 639. 
However, emphasizing “the comity that 
American courts should accord foreign 
bankruptcy proceedings,” the District 
Court did stay the litigation before 
it for a period of 60 days to provide 
the Receiver “an opportunity to seek 
appropriate relief under [C]hapter 
15.”  Id.  
Another case addressing procedural 
matters under Chapter 15 is In re Ho Seok 
Lee, 348 B. R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 10, 2006) (“Ho Seok Lee”) (Snyder, 
Bankruptcy Judge).  Ho Seok Lee was 
the Court-appointed manager of Young 
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Chang Co., Ltd. (“Young Chang”) in 
bankruptcy proceedings in Korea.  Ho 
Seok Lee, 348 B.R. at 800.  In the Korean 
proceedings a creditor, Samsong 
Manufacturing Co. (“Samsong”), filed 
secured claims against Young Chang 
in the amount of $2.1 billion.  Id.  The 
Korean bankruptcy court approved 
Young Chang’s plan of reorganization, 
which provided alternative recoveries 
for Samsong depending on whether 
Samsong’s claims were ultimately 
determined to be secured or unsecured: 
(i) a 40% recovery if unsecured or (ii) 
a recovery of 90% in cash, with an 
additional 10% in stock, if secured.  Id. 
After Young Chang had filed its plan 
with the Korean Court, but before the 
plan was approved, Samsong filed suit 
in the United States against Young 
Chang’s wholly-owned subsidiary, 
AND Music Corp. (“AND Music”), in 
Washington state court.7  Id.  Before 
the Washington state court action went 
to trial, Young Chang filed a Petition 
for Recognition of Foreign Main 
Proceeding under Chapter 15 in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court.  Id.  In addition 
to seeking an order recognizing the 
Korean bankruptcy proceeding as the 
“Foreign Main Proceeding,” Young 
Chang sought provisional relief against 
Samsong pursuant to section 1519.  Id. 
at 800-01.  Specifically, Young Chang 
sought and obtained an order providing 
that “any right to transfer, encumber 
or otherwise dispose of assets of the 
Debtor by any party other than the 
foreign representative or its designee is 
hereby suspended.”  Id.  
After entry of the orders granting 
recognition of the Foreign Main 
Proceeding and granting provisional 
relief, Young Chang sought a permanent 
injunction enjoining Samsong “from 
recovering or seeking to recover any 
debt in excess of the amounts provided 
by Young Chang’s Korean Plan.”  Id. 
at 801.  In sum and substance, Young 
Chang wanted to permanently enjoin 
Samsong from pursuing the Washington 
state court litigation.8  Id.  
7 The decision in Ho Seok Lee notes that the Wash-
ington state court lawsuit sought “to recover 
accounts receivable that AND Music owe[d] to 
Young Chang” but does not otherwise describe 
the claims in that lawsuit.  Ho Seok Lee, 343 B.R. 
at 800.
8 Despite the automatic stay under Chapter 15, 
a permanent injunction was necessary to pro-
Samsong raised only a procedural 
objection in opposition to Young 
Chang’s request for an injunction: 
Samsong argued that Young Chang 
could not seek an injunction by way of 
a motion in the Chapter 15 case; rather, 
Samsong argued, Young Chang was 
required by Bankruptcy Rule 7001 to 
commence a separate adversary proceeding 
in order to obtain injunctive relief.  Id. 
Analyzing section 1521, the legislative 
history of Chapter 15 and decisions 
interpreting former Bankruptcy 
Code section 304, the Court held that 
since a permanent injunction could 
be entered in a Chapter 15 case, a 
separate adversary proceeding was not 
required.  Id. at 801-02.  The Court 
focused on section 1521(a), which 
provides that “appropriate relief” can 
be granted upon request of a foreign 
representative, and that under section 
1521(a)(1), this included “staying the 
commencement or continuation of 
an individual action or proceeding 
concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, 
obligations or liabilities . . . .”  Id.  The 
Court also pointed out that in section 
1521(e), Congress provided that “the 
standards, procedures, and limitations 
applicable to an injunction shall apply 
to relief under [subsection (a)(1)].” 
Id. at 801.
Looking to case law preceding 
enactment of Chapter 15, the Court 
also determined that under former 
section 304, permanent injunctions 
could be obtained without the need 
for commencing a separate adversary 
proceeding.  Id.  Specifically, in In re 
Rukavina, 227 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1998), the court held that a foreign 
representative need not commence a 
separate adversary proceeding in order 
to obtain injunctive relief under section 
304.  Id.  (citing Rukavina, 227 B.R. at 
239, 240).  Further, in Ho Seok Lee, the 
court noted that the legislative history of 
Chapter 15 indicated that Congress did 
not intend to add procedural hurdles 
for seeking injunctive relief that had 
not been previously established under 
section 304.  Id. at 802.  Accordingly, 
the Court held that a foreign 
representative need not commence a 
separate adversary proceeding in order 
to seek injunctive relief under Chapter 
15 and entered an order permanently 
tect the former debtor upon the close of the 
case.  Ho Seok Lee, 348 B.R. at 802-03.
enjoining the Washington state court 
action.  Id. at 803.
Chapter 15 has brought with it certain 
procedural requirements that must 
be adhered to, but bankruptcy courts 
continue to retain (and exercise) 
flexibility in granting relief, as 
demonstrated by the decisions in J.A. 
Jones and Ho Seok Lee.
3. Cases Involving Questions of 
Public Policy
Public policy concerns took center 
stage in In re Ephedra Products Liability 
Litigation, 349 B. R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 11, 2006) (“Ephedra”) (Rakoff, 
District Judge).  In Ephedra,  U.S.-
based products liability actions had 
been consolidated into a multi-district 
federal court litigation.  Ephedra, 349 
B.R. at 334.  The defendant in those 
actions, a Canadian-based company 
named Muscletech Research and 
Development, Inc. (“Muscletech”), 
eventually commenced insolvency 
proceedings in Canada.  Id.  The 
Canadian court appointed a Monitor 
over the insolvency proceedings; and 
the Monitor commenced Chapter 15 
proceedings in the United States.  Id. 
The Canadian insolvency proceedings 
were recognized as “foreign main 
proceedings” under Chapter 15.  Id.  
Claims resolution procedures 
were negotiated in the Canadian 
proceedings; and they were  approved 
by the Canadian court.  Id.  Those 
procedures provided for (i) mandatory 
mediation and (ii) the estimation by 
a claims officer to be appointed by 
the Canadian court of any claims not 
resolved through mediation.  Id.  The 
Monitor sought an order under Chapter 
15 enforcing the procedures that had 
been approved by the Canadian court. 
Id.  Personal injury plaintiffs in the U.S.-
based multi-district litigation objected 
on public policy grounds, arguing 
that the claims resolution process 
approved by the Canadian Court 
denied them due process and a right 
to a jury trial.  Id. at 335.  As authority 
for their objections, the plaintiffs 
cited Bankruptcy Code section 1506, 
which provides that: “[n]othing in this 
[C]hapter 15 prevents the court from 
refusing to take an action governed by 
this [c]hapter if the action would be 
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manifestly contrary to the public policy 
of the United States.”  Id.   (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 1506).
The Court rejected these arguments. 
Id. at 335-36.  Looking to Congressional 
intent, the Court stated: “In adopting 
Chapter 15, Congress instructed 
the courts that the exception [in 
section 1506] should be ‘narrowly 
interpreted’ as ‘[t]he word ‘manifestly’ 
in international usage restricts the 
public policy exception to the most 
fundamental policies of the United 
States.’”  Id. at 336 (citing, inter alia, 
H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt 1, at 106 n.101, 
as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 169 
n.101).  Secondly, the court determined 
that a jury trial, while an important 
component of the U.S. legal system, 
was not necessary for the rendering of 
a fair and impartial verdict in Canada 
and that the procedures approved by 
the Canadian court were not manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the 
United States:  
Obviously, the constitutional 
right to a  jury trial is an important 
component of our legal system 
. . . .  But the notion that a fair 
and impartial verdict cannot be 
rendered in the absence of a 
jury trial defies the experience of 
most of the civilized world.
Id. at 337.  Finally, in overruling the 
plaintiff’s objection and approving the 
Canadian claims resolution procedures, 
the court noted that the only prejudice 
alleged would have been the loss of 
some degree of bargaining leverage. 
Id.  With this in mind, the Court ruled 
that the section 1506 objection was 
without merit and that it would enforce 
the order of the Canadian insolvency 
court and require compliance with the 
Canadian claims resolution procedures. 
Id.  
Conclusion
Upon the second anniversary of Chapter 
15’s effectiveness, it is clear from both 
the procedural and substantive issues 
that have been litigated that significant 
questions remain as to the scope of 
available relief, and the manner of 
obtaining it, under Chapter 15.  
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Taxation Cases
Forrest Lewis
IRS NARROWS SCOPE OF SEC. 382 BUILT IN 
GAIN
When there is a change of ownership of a corporation with tax net operating losses, certain 
anti-loss trafficking rules found in IRC Sec. 382 kick in to 
reduce the amount and usefulness of the loss.  These rules 
frequently come into play on the sale or reorganization of 
troubled companies.  These rules call for an increase in the 
usability of the net operating losses when there is a “built in 
gain” such as the sale of an appreciated asset after the change 
in ownership.  Some tax practitioners took the position that 
“prepaid income” qualified as a type of built in gain, thus 
increasing the amount of net operating losses which could be 
recognized in the first 5 years after the change in ownership. 
Recently the IRS issued proposed and temporary regulations 
which exclude prepaid income from the definition of built 
in gain.  This regulation is unfavorable to taxpayers. (Reg. 
§1.382-7T)
The IRS explanation states that the Congressional Committee 
Reports that accompanied the enactment of section 
382(h)(6)(A) both state that items of income attributable to 
the pre-change period include accounts receivable of a cash 
basis taxpayer that arose before the change date and are 
collected after that date, the gain on completion of a long-
term contract performed by a taxpayer using the completed 
contract method of accounting that is attributable to the pre-
change period, and the recognition of income attributable to 
the pre-change period pursuant to section 481 adjustments, 
as when the loss corporation is required to change to the 
accrual method.
The IRS believes that prepaid income is distinguishable 
from the income items described in the committee report 
examples (above). In each of the committee report examples, 
the item of income is attributable to the pre-change period 
because that is the period in which performance occurred 
and expenses were incurred to earn the income. By contrast, 
prepaid income is attributable to the post-change period 
because that is the period in which performance occurred 
and expenses were incurred to earn the income. Examples 
of prepaid income which cannot be included in built in 
gain under the new Regulation are: prepaid magazine and 
newspaper subscriptions under Sec. 455, advance payments 
for the sale of goods and services under Sec. 451, and 
deferred income from the performance of services under 
Rev. Proc. 2004-34.
Thus, the key is that the regulation conforms the treatment 
of built in gains more to the financial accounting treatment 
of the income.  If the income was earned prior to the change 
in ownership, it can be built in gain which is favorable for 
net operating loss carryover under Sec. 382.  If the income is 
earned after the change, the regulation bars treating it as a 
built in gain, which is unfavorable.
IRS ANNOUNCES NEW FINANCIAL STANDARDS FOR LIVING 
EXPENSES
IRS Collections Division has announced revisions to the 
“Financial Standards” which it uses to determine a taxpayer’s 
ability to pay delinquent taxes.  The same standards are also 
used by bankruptcy courts in classifying individuals in the 
various chapters of individual bankruptcy. 
The Collection Financial Standards were revised on 
10/01/07 to:
• Eliminate income ranges for National Standard 
Expenses (the monthly allowance for food, clothing 
and miscellaneous for two persons will be $925)
• Eliminate separate tables for Alaska and Hawaii, 
creating one set of tables for National Standard 
Expenses 
• Create a new National Standards category for Health 
Care (the monthly allowance will be the health 
insurance premium plus $54 per person under age 
65) 
• Expand the number of household categories for 
Housing & Utility Expenses (which now includes a 
small amount for cell phone costs)   (the monthly 
housing and utility allowance for  Pushmataha Co., 
Oklahoma is $684 for 2 persons, Marin Co., California 
is $2,861)
• Create equal allowances for first and second vehicles 
under Transportation Expenses (national monthly 
allowance for 1 car is $458 plus a local operating cost 
which ranges between $169 in St. Louis and $256 in 
San Francisco)
• Create a separate nationwide Public Transportation 
allowance of $163 per month
The revised standards are effective for financial analysis 
conducted by IRS on or after October 1, 2007.  They will be 
effective for bankruptcy court deliberations starting January 
1, 2008.
Here is a link to the IRS webpage:
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html
IRS PROVIDES FAVORABLE RULING ON AGING OF 
INDIVIDUAL TAXES IN DISASTER AREAS AND  
COMBAT ZONES
In Revenue Ruling 2007-59, the IRS “strong arms” the 
statute to provide a very narrow but taxpayer favorable 
position concerning the difference between due dates for 
individual income taxes for Bankruptcy Code purposes and 
the extended due dates for Internal Revenue Code purposes 
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pursuant to Presidential declarations. 
The ruling illustrates with the following 
examples:
“On April 12, 2007, Individual A timely 
requests a 6-month extension of time 
to file an income tax return for 2006 
[to October 15, 2007]. A’s principal 
residence …is in State Y. On October 
2, 2007, disaster Q strikes State Y. On 
October 5, 2007, the President declares 
a disaster … The Service issues a news 
release announcing relief for taxpayers 
affected by disaster Q. The news release 
defines the period from October 2, 
2007, through December 31, 2007, as 
a disaster relief period and provides 
that the deadlines for specified acts, 
including the filing of an income tax 
return, that fall within the disaster relief 
period are postponed until December 
31, 2007. A files an income tax return 
for 2006 showing a balance due on 
December 20, 2007. A files a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition on November 24, 
2010, listing the Service as a creditor 
with respect to the 2006 income tax 
liability. The case is treated as a “no-
asset” Chapter 7 case, and the Service 
does not file a proof of claim with respect 
to A’s 2006 federal income tax liability. 
…On January 18, 2011, the bankruptcy 
court grants A a discharge pursuant to 
section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.” 
 
The question is whether the extended 
filing due date of December 31 starts 
the three year period for determining 
“old and cold” tax liabilities which 
can be discharged in bankruptcy? 
The Service concludes that the three 
year period still starts on October 15, 
2007, the original extended due date. 
Since the taxpayer filed his petition on 
November 24, 2010, the unpaid 2006 
taxes can be discharged in bankruptcy. 
The ruling then goes on with the 
example of “Individual B who serves 
in the US Armed Forces in an area 
designated by the President as a 
combat zone …from March 17, 2005, 
through August 1, 2006. On September 
20, 2006, B files an income tax return 
for 2004 showing a balance due. B files 
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on 
November 3, 2008, listing the Service 
as a creditor with respect to the 2004 
federal income tax liability. The case is 
treated as a “no-asset” Chapter 7 case, 
and the Service does not file a proof 
of claim... On December 11, 2008, the 
bankruptcy court grants B a discharge 
pursuant to section 727(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”
The ruling holds that the due date of 
the 2004 return for calculating the three 
year period for bankruptcy purposes is 
still April 15, 2005.  Since more than 
three years elapse before the petition 
date of November 3, 2008, the 2004 
unpaid tax liability can be discharged.
Commentary:  This ruling is doubly 
favorable since it brings valuable 
certainty to the issue besides increasing 
the chance that troubled individual 
taxpayers in affected areas will be 
able to receive a discharge for unpaid 
federal income taxes.  
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China’s recently effective Enterprise Bankruptcy Law should be recognized as groundbreaking legislation that is the culmination of China’s efforts 
to improve and unify its bankruptcy laws, and signal its 
continuing embrace of a market-based economy.  Given 
the commitment with which China seeks to become a full-
fledged member of the World Trade Organization, there 
should be little surprise that the New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law encompasses many of the same complex bankruptcy 
concepts found in more established bankruptcy laws, such 
as the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Even where the provisions of 
the nascent bankruptcy law do not fully address some of the 
issues that can arise in bankruptcy cases, the recognition 
of these issues makes it likely that future provisions 
promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court will clarify the 
new law and provide procedures to address these issues. 
Moreover, as the first cases are being filed, the areas of the 
new law that need further development can be observed 
and tested.
The new law was formulated in order to regularize 
bankruptcy procedures, fairly dispose of credits and debts, 
protect the relative rights of creditors and debtors, and 
maintain China’s socialist market economy.  The new law 
eliminates the requirement under prior law of governmental 
approval to file a bankruptcy application.  Instead, there is a 
fifteen-day waiting period between the time the bankruptcy 
application is filed and when the court must make a ruling 
on whether to accept the application.  The new law contains 
provisions that are substantially different from previous 
bankruptcy schemes.  For example, the new law provides 
for liquidation, reorganization, and conciliation; limits 
government intervention in bankruptcy proceedings; 
requires the appointment of an administrator to oversee 
the case; and acknowledges the concept of post-acceptance 
debtor loans.  Some of the more significant provisions of the 
New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law are described below, along 
with contrasts and comparisons to their U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code counterparts.
Who May Be a Debtor
Unlike China’s previous 1986 bankruptcy law, the new law 
is not limited to state owned enterprises (SOEs).  The new 
law applies to any “enterprise legal person” that is insolvent. 
The omission of references to SOEs indicates that non-SOEs 
now qualify under a unified bankruptcy law.  Individuals, 
however, continue to be excluded from filing bankruptcy 
applications.  Under the U.S. system, entities eligible to 
file bankruptcy petitions under the relevant chapters of 
the Bankruptcy Code are carefully defined therein, and 
individuals are permitted to file for bankruptcy protection.
The New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law also requires the 
debtor to make a showing that it is unable to pay off the 
debts as they become due, and that its assets are insufficient 
to pay off all of its debts.  These insolvency tests mirror the 
“balance sheet” insolvency and “equitable” insolvency tests 
familiar to practitioners under the U.S. bankruptcy law. 
Further, an enterprise legal person may apply specifically 
for reorganization where “there is an obvious possibility 
that it will lose the capability to repay its debts.”  This 
more flexible financial prerequisite allows a debtor to avail 
itself of the reorganization provisions of the new law, even 
where it would not qualify for liquidation or conciliation. 
These requirements generally contrast the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, which does not set forth any test of insolvency as a 
prerequisite for a voluntary filing by the debtor.
The Automatic Stay
The New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law contains provisions that 
prohibit certain actions by the debtor and creditors upon the 
acceptance of the bankruptcy application by the court.  For 
example, the debtor may not pay off pre-acceptance debts. 
Creditors are enjoined from enforcing claims against the 
debtor’s property.  Pending litigation involving the debtor 
is suspended, and any post-acceptance litigation must be 
commenced in the court presiding over the bankruptcy 
proceeding.
In contrast to the limited circumstances in which the 
automatic stay is imposed under China’s new law, the 
automatic stay provided for in U.S. Bankruptcy Code section 
362 is extremely broad in scope, and is intended to encompass 
most formal or informal acts against the debtor or property 
of the debtor’s estate.  The automatic spell is necessarily 
broad to give effect to the goal of providing the debtor a 
“breathing spell” in which to attempt to reorganize without 
the pressure of collection actions and litigation, for example. 
Moreover, the automatic stay under the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code is triggered upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
by the debtor, unlike in the New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 
where there is a gap period between the debtor’s submission 
of an application and the court’s acceptance of the case.
The Administrator
The provisions in the new law allowing the court to designate 
an administrator represents a departure from the prior 
Chinese bankruptcy law, which provided only for a liquidation 
team (usually consisting of government officials, rather than 
independent organizations) to take over the management 
of the debtor’s business.  This is consistent with the newly 
implemented reorganization and conciliation options 
available to debtors, and also signals the government’s 
willingness to limit its involvement in the bankruptcy process. 
Under the new law, the court may designate an administrator 
from among qualified “social intermediary institutions” or 
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individuals with requisite professional 
knowledge from a social intermediary 
institution listed on registers compiled 
by the provincial courts.  Provisions 
clarifying and specifying procedures 
regarding the designation and 
compensation of administrators 
were recently promulgated by the 
Supreme People’s Court and likely 
will aid in the implementation of the 
administrator provisions under the new 
law.  Among the clarifications provided 
by the designation and compensation 
provisions is the likelihood that foreign 
professionals with relevant experience—
such as international accounting 
and law firms—are not eligible to be 
appointed administrators.
Once designated, the role of the 
administrator is similar to that of a 
trustee under U.S. bankruptcy law.  The 
administrator essentially is charged 
with taking over the debtor’s property, 
managing the debtor’s business, 
and is held accountable to the court 
and representatives of the creditors. 
Among the administrator’s duties 
are the following:  (i) investigate the 
debtor’s property and draft a master 
property report; (ii) determine the daily 
expenses and other necessary expenses 
for the debtor; (iii) determine whether 
the debtor’s business shall continue 
to operate before the first creditors’ 
meeting is convened; (iv) manage 
and dispose the debtor’s property; (v) 
participate in lawsuits or arbitrations on 
the debtor’s behalf; and (vi) convene 
the creditors’ meeting.
By comparison, under the U.S. law, 
in a chapter 7 liquidation, the United 
States Trustee appoints a disinterested 
person that is a member of a panel of 
private trustees as an interim trustee. 
Subsequently, the creditors may elect a 
disinterested person to serve as trustee 
during the pendency of the case.  The 
primary duty of the chapter 7 trustee 
is to collect and liquidate the property 
of the debtor’s estate for distribution 
to creditors, in accordance with the 
best interest of the parties.  Unlike 
under the Chinese system (where an 
administrator remains in place even 
after an administrator is designated), a 
trustee generally is not appointed in a 
chapter 11 reorganization—the debtor 
continues to manage its own affairs as a 
debtor in possession.
The Creditors’ Meeting
A creditor who has lawfully asserted 
a claim is a member of the creditors’ 
meeting and may attend the creditors’ 
meeting and vote.  Resolutions of 
the creditors’ meeting are passed if 
adopted by more than half in number 
of the creditors eligible to vote, and 
more than half in amount of unsecured 
credits eligible to vote.  Unless appealed 
within fifteen days of adoption, 
resolutions are binding on all creditors. 
The duties of the creditors’ meeting 
includes investigating the validity of 
claims, oversight of the administrator’s 
performance and compensation, 
determining whether to continue or 
terminate the debtor’s business, and 
determining whether to adopt any 
plans.  Lastly, the creditors’ meeting 
may establish a creditors’ committee 
to, among other things, supervise 
the management and disposal of the 
debtor’s property and the distribution 
of the bankruptcy estate, and perform 
other duties authorized by the 
creditors’ meeting.  The committee 
is to consist of not more than nine 
creditor representatives, of which one 
must be a representative of the debtors’ 
employees.
Similarly, in a chapter 11 case under 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the United 
States Trustee is required to appoint 
a committee of unsecured creditors 
as soon as practicable following the 
commencement of the case.  The 
appointment of the creditors’ committee 
is intended to ensure that the interests 
of unsecured creditors are represented 
and protected, and to establish a body 
to supervise the debtor or trustee and 
negotiate a plan of reorganization.  The 
creditors committee may investigate the 
debtor, participate in the plan process, 
request the appointment of a trustee or 
examiner, and perform other services in 
the interest of its constituents.  Under 
U.S. law, the members of the committee 
consists of the persons, willing to serve, 
that hold the seven largest claims 
against the debtor, although there 
is no statutory bar to having more or 
fewer than seven members, nor is 
there a requirement that any member 
represent employee interests.  Upon 
request of a party in interest, the court 
may order the U.S. Trustee to change 
committee membership to ensure 
adequate representation of the creditor 
body.
Claims and Priority
The New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
recognizes the following classes of 
claims, in order of descending priority: 
(i) secured claims; (ii) labor claims; (iii) 
tax claims; and (iv) unsecured claims. 
Unlike the prior Chinese bankruptcy 
law, the new law provides for secured 
claims to be paid first in priority over 
labor claims; previously, as a result of 
China’s emphasis on providing full 
employment for its workers, rights of 
holders of secured claims could be 
compromised to ensure that labor 
claims were paid.  China’s shift to a 
market-based economy and its desire 
to participate fully as a member of the 
World Trade Organization likely has 
had an impact on this apparent shift in 
focus from protecting workers’ rights 
to facilitating secured lending.  Even 
so, China remains more deferential to 
labor claims than the U.S., as there is 
no separate class for labor claims under 
the U.S. law (although the Bankruptcy 
Code does afford some priority of 
payment to allowed unsecured wage 
claims of employees, up to $10,950). 
Classification of claims under U.S. law 
generally are similar:  the Bankruptcy 
Code groups claims into secured claims, 
priority claims, and general unsecured 
claims.
Procedurally, under the Chinese law, 
the People’s Court sets a bar date for 
asserting claims, and any creditor 
failing to timely assert a claim cannot 
exercise its rights under the new law, 
including participating at creditors’ 
meetings and voting on resolutions. 
Creditors asserting claims must submit 
written materials and evidence in 
support of the claims.  If the debtor 
and creditors do not object to the 
claim, the court confirms the claim by 
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order.  Otherwise, parties may litigate 
the claim before the court.  Apart from 
these provisions, the new law does not 
provide any guidance on the timing or 
procedures of the claims reconciliation 
process.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code has similar 
provisions relating to the claims process. 
Bar dates for filing proofs of claim are 
set by the court, and a creditor failing 
to timely file a proof of claim are not 
treated as creditors for the purposes of 
voting or distribution.  Late proofs of 
claim may be filed, but only with the 
court’s permission and for cause.  The 
filing of a proof of claim is prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the claim.  
Secured Claims and Adequate 
Protection
As noted above, the priority of secured 
claims over labor claims is a significant 
amendment to the prior Chinese 
bankruptcy law.  In addition, the new 
law permits a secured creditor to hold a 
secured claim for up to the value of the 
collateral, and a deficiency claim to the 
extent that the value of the collateral 
is less than the amount of the secured 
claim.  It should be noted, however, 
that the availability of a deficiency 
claim for secured creditors is limited to 
liquidation cases and not reorganization 
cases under the new law, as it is drafted. 
It is possible that this anomaly is the 
result of a drafting oversight, and future 
clarification or correction may remedy 
the inconsistency.
The bifurcation of a secured claim 
under the New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law is analogous to the treatment of 
secured claims under U.S. law.  The 
U.S. law, however, provides for several 
other protections for the secured 
creditor that are not present in China’s 
new law.  For example, under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, a secured creditor in 
a chapter 11 case may choose to have 
its claim secured in its entire amount, 
rather than bifurcated with a deficiency 
claim.  As such, the creditor is entitled 
to have his entire claim treated as a 
secured claim even if the value of the 
collateral is less than the amount of the 
debt, so that the creditor may receive 
the benefit of any enhanced value 
from an appreciation in the value of 
the collateral.  Also under the U.S. 
law, a secured creditor is entitled to 
any accrued interest, fees, and other 
charges to the extent that the claim is 
over-secured.
The concept of adequate protection, 
familiar to the U.S. bankruptcy practice, 
appears in a similar, but more limited, 
form under China’s new law.  The 
administrator may take back collateral 
pledged or withheld by paying off debts 
or providing security, to the extent 
that the amount paid or the alternate 
security provided is limited to the then-
current market value of the collateral, 
if the value of the collateral is lower 
than the amount of secured claims 
thereon.  Under U.S. law, a secured 
creditor may seek adequate protection 
from the diminution in value of its 
collateral as a result of the automatic 
stay, the debtor’s use of the collateral, 
or the granting of another lien against 
the property to secure post-petition 
financing.  Adequate protection can 
come in various forms, including 
periodic cash payments, additional or 
replacement liens, or the “indubitable 
equivalent” of the secured creditor’s 
interest in the property.
Executory Contracts
In contrast to the well-developed U.S. 
law with respect to executory contracts, 
the New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
contains only one provision relating to 
the rejection or assumption of contracts. 
The new law provides that, following 
the court’s acceptance of a bankruptcy 
application, the administrator is 
authorized to reject or assume a 
pre-acceptance executory contract. 
The administrator (or the debtor, 
if permitted to continue to manage 
its affairs) must notify the contract 
counterparty within two months after 
acceptance of the application (or 30 
days after receiving demand from the 
counterparty for a determination), or 
the contract is deemed rejected.  If 
the administrator decides to assume a 
contract, the counterparty may demand 
security, and if the administrator 
is unable to provide security, the 
contract is deemed rejected.  The 
requirement of providing security in 
order to assume a contract is similar 
to the concept of adequate assurance 
of future performance under U.S. 
law.  The new law does not otherwise 
address the assumption and assignment 
of contracts.
The ability to assume or reject executory 
contracts, and the requirement to 
provide what is essentially adequate 
assurance of future performance, are 
rooted in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as 
well.  Under the U.S. law, the trustee 
generally may assume or reject executory 
contracts and unexpired leases at any 
time prior to the confirmation of a 
plan, although counterparties may 
seek an earlier determination.  In a 
liquidation case, if the trustee does 
not assume or reject within 60 days of 
the commencement of the case, the 
contract or lease is deemed rejected. 
Further, with respect to commercial 
leases, the trustee must assume or reject 
within the first 120 days of the case. 
The court may grant a single 90-day 
extension, but no additional extensions 
are permitted without the lessor’s prior 
written consent.  Unlike the Chinese 
law, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires 
court approval of assumptions and 
rejections of contracts and leases, and 
requires that all defaults be cured upon 
assumption.
Reorganization
One of the more notable features of the 
New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is the 
inclusion of a chapter on reorganization. 
As with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
provisions on voluntary and involuntary 
chapter 11 filings, either the debtor 
or creditors may file an application 
for reorganization under the new law. 
Consistent with an application for 
a liquidation proceeding, the filing 
of a reorganization application does 
not commence the reorganization 
proceeding; the court must examine 
the application and issue an order 
permitting the debtor to commence the 
reorganization process.  As discussed 
above in Who May Be a Debtor, the 
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debtor must demonstrate one of the 
tests for insolvency in order to qualify 
for reorganization.
With respect to an involuntary 
reorganization, the new law offers little 
more than that “creditors” may file.  In 
contrast, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
expressly provides that a bankruptcy 
petition may be filed by three or 
more creditors with undisputed, non-
contingent, unsecured claims in the 
aggregate amount of at least $13,475 
more than the value of any lien on 
the property.  Under both U.S. and 
Chinese law, an involuntary liquidation 
may be converted to a reorganization 
case.  Under the New Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law, the debtor or equity 
holders representing more than one-
tenth of the debtor’s registered capital 
may apply to the People’s Court to 
convert the case to a reorganization 
proceeding.  Similarly, a debtor in an 
involuntary chapter 7 case may, as an 
absolute right, convert the case to a 
chapter 11 reorganization at any time 
during the case.
Another significant aspect of the 
chapter on reorganization is the 
provision relating to post-acceptance 
financing, often a critical element of a 
debtor’s ability to continue to operate 
during the reorganization process, as 
exemplified in the U.S. system by the 
importance of debtor in possession 
(DIP) financing.  Even so, the Chinese 
law contains only one provision 
addressing the issue, which provides that 
“[d]uring the reorganization period, 
if the debtor or the administrator 
borrows for the purpose of continuing 
to operate its business, a security 
interest may be created for such a loan.” 
Although important in that the new 
law recognizes the concept of secured 
DIP financing, the provision is a far cry 
from the well-developed scheme under 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which 
provides a range of protections to post-
petition lenders, from lending on a 
superpriority basis to offering priming 
liens.
The new law requires the debtor 
or the administrator to submit a 
reorganization plan within six months 
from the date of the commencement 
of the reorganization procedure.  For 
“justifiable reason,” this period for 
submitting a plan may be extended for 
another three months at the request of 
the debtor or administrator.  Depending 
upon who is controlling the case, the 
debtor or the administrator may submit 
a plan; creditors are not permitted to 
file a competing plan.  Under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is given 
a period of exclusivity in which only it 
may file a plan of reorganization, but 
at the expiration of that time period 
(along with any permitted extensions), 
any party in interest may file a plan. 
Moreover, the Chinese law provides 
that if no plan is submitted within 
the time required for the debtor or 
administrator to submit a plan, the 
court shall issue an order terminating 
the reorganization procedure and 
declaring the debtor bankrupt.
Under the New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law, any plan that is submitted 
must contain the following:  (i) the 
operation scheme of the reorganized 
enterprise; (ii) the classification of the 
claims; (iii) the adjustment scheme of 
the claims; (iv) the repayment scheme 
of the claims; (v) the time limit for 
executing the plan; (vi) the time limit 
for supervising the implementation 
of the plan; and (vii) other plans that 
are beneficial to the reorganization 
of the debtor.  These requirements 
are far fewer and less comprehensive 
than the plan requirements under the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Also, the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code contains extensive 
provisions on disclosure requirements 
in connection with any solicitation of 
plan acceptances, so that creditors have 
access to “adequate information” in 
order to make an “informed judgment” 
regarding any proposed plan; there is 
no analogous counterpart in the New 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.
The new law provides that voting on a 
proposed plan is conducted by class, 
and a plan is deemed to be passed by 
a class if more than one-half of the 
creditors of a voting group present and 
entitled to vote, and representing more 
than two-thirds of the total claims of the 
group, vote to pass the plan.  Similarly, 
in the U.S., a class of claims accepts a 
plan if creditors that hold at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-
half in number of the allowed claims of 
such class vote to accept the plan.  The 
difference between the two laws is that 
class acceptance under the Chinese 
law requires the affirmative vote of 
more than two-thirds in amount of all 
claims, not just claims held by voting 
creditors.
If the plan is not passed, the new law 
provides for something similar to 
cramdown under U.S. law.  The new 
law allows the debtor or administrator 
to engage in negotiations with non-
accepting voting groups, and then 
to conduct a second round of voting 
following the negotiations.  If those 
voting groups decline to have a second 
round of voting, or do not pass the plan 
after the second round of voting, the 
debtor or administrator may request 
that the court approve the plan if all 
the following conditions are satisfied:
(i)  secured claims will be full paid 
with respect to such property, and any 
losses from the late payment will be 
compensated fairly;
(ii)  employee claims and taxes will be 
fully paid;
(iii)  unsecured claims will be repaid 
in a proportion that is not less than 
the proportion available under a 
liquidation procedure;
(iv)  adjustment to investors’ rights and 
interests is fair and equitable;
(v)  members of the same voting group 
are treated fairly and equally, and the 
repayment priority does not violate the 
payment priority scheme under Article 
112; and 
(vi)  the business operation plan is 
feasible.
The provisions in the new law embody 
concepts similar in many respects to 
those in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
relating to cramdown, particularly the 
requirement of the “fair and equitable” 
test.  However, the Chinese scheme 
does depart significantly from the 
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U.S. scheme in some areas, including 
the leverage that labor and tax claims 
have over the debtor—those claims can 
always refuse to accept a plan because 
the cramdown provisions require that 
they be paid in full.
If a plan is not timely submitted, or 
is not passed by the voting class and 
fails to be crammed down, the court 
may terminate the reorganization 
procedure.  In addition, creditors may 
seek to terminate a reorganization 
and convert it into a liquidation if the 
debtor is unable or fails to execute 
the plan of reorganization.  Finally, 
during the reorganization period, the 
administrator and interested parties 
may petition the court to terminate 
the reorganization procedure for 
the following:  (i) the management 
and financial situation of the debtor 
deteriorates to the point that there 
is no possibility to save the debtor; 
(ii) the debtor commits fraudulent 
conduct, maliciously decreases assets, 
delays without cause in paying debts 
or takes other actions disadvantageous 
to creditors; or (iii) the debtor’s 
behavior causes the administrator 
to become unable to perform his 
duties.  These circumstances are 
similar to the standard used in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code to appoint a 
trustee in a chapter 11 reorganization, 
although the appointment of a trustee 
does not terminate the case, but rather 
terminates the debtor’s authority to 
continue to operate as a debtor in 
possession.  Moreover, under U.S. 
law, the debtor or a party in interest 
may seek a conversion of a chapter 
11 case to a chapter 7 liquidation or a 
dismissal of a chapter 11 case for cause, 
including the continued or significant 
diminution is estate assets.
The New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
has a pair of provisions that, when 
read together, operate to discharge 
the debtor of claims treated under 
a confirmed plan of reorganization. 
These provisions provide that the 
plan is binding on the debtor and 
all creditors, and that the debtor is 
exempted from repayment liability 
for debts that have been reduced or 
exempted in accordance with the 
plan upon the completion of the 
implementation of the plan.  This 
is similar to the discharge granted 
a debtor under U.S. law, whereby 
the confirmation of a plan relieves a 
debtor from all prepetition liabilities 
in exchange for the treatment of such 
liabilities under the plan.  The debtor is 
thus given a “fresh start” to operate its 
business outside of bankruptcy.
Conclusion
The New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
is first and foremost a new law that 
manages to encompass many concepts 
present in well-established laws like 
the U.S. bankruptcy law, but remains 
untested and rudimentary in many 
respects.  The numerous advances 
of the new law, however, should not 
be overlooked, as they represent a 
substantial milestone in China’s effort 
to implement a bankruptcy system 
that will accommodate its progression 
towards a market economy. 
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U.S. Bankruptcy Code New Chinese Bankruptcy Law
• Eligibility for Chapter 11 – no requirement to demonstrate 
insolvency
• Must establish inability to pay debts as they mature or have 
insufficient assets to pay debts; Court must be satisfied 
reorganization is necessary.
• Who May be a Debtor – all but railroads, insurance companies 
and banks.  Section 109.
• Enterprise Legal Person. Article 2. 
• Debtor allowed to operate business in the ordinary course.  
Section 363(b).
• Debtor may “manage its affairs” under administrator’s 
supervision.  Article 73.
• Duties and powers of debtor in possession/trustee.  Section 
1106.
• Duties and powers of administrator. Article 25.
• Executory contracts.  Section 365.
o Provides for assumption and rejection.
• Executory contracts.  Article 18.
o Provides for assumption and rejection.
• Appointment of Trustee.  Section 1104.
• Conversion to Chapter 7/dismissal.  Section 1112.
• Termination of Reorganization Procedure.  Article 78.
• Administrative Claims/Actual & Necessary Benefit to the Estate. 
Section 503(b)/507(a).
o Paid prior to other unsecured claims.
• Bankruptcy Expenses and Common-Interest Debts.  Articles 41-
43.
o Paid prior to other unsecured claims.
• DIP Financing.  Section 364.
o Provides detailed rules.
• Loans permitted during Reorganization Period.   
Article 75.
o Additional rules/guidance needed.
• Creation of Bankruptcy Estate. Section 541. • The Debtor’s Property.  Article 30.
• Automatic Stay.  Section 362.
o Enjoins all acts and actions against debtors and debtor’s 
property.
• Suspension of acts against debtor’s property.  
Article 19.
• Suspension of Litigation (litigation may resume after 
Administrator takes over).  Article 20.
• Venue.  28 U.S.C. § 1408.
o Location of Chapter 11 case: domicile, or principal place of 
business/assets in the U.S. during 180 days prior to filing (or 
greatest portion thereof), or district where bankruptcy case 
of an affiliate is pending
• Venue. Article 3.
o Location of case: debtor’s domicile – place of main business 
office or company registration.
• Preferences.  Section 547.
o Recovery of transfers, made within 90 days prior to filing, 
on account of antecedent debt and giving advantage to 
preferred creditor.
• Avoidance of Payment.  Article 32.
o Avoidance of transfers made to creditors by insolvent debtor 
within 6 months prior to filing.
• Fraudulent Conveyances.  Section 548.
o Avoidance of transfers made within 2 years prior to filing, 
either with the intention to defraud creditors or by an 
insolvent debtor for grossly inadequate consideration.
• Fraudulent Transfers.  
o Avoidance of certain transactions made within 1 year prior 
to filing. Article 31.
o Avoidance of actions to hide assets or fabricate debts. Article 
33.
• Time Deadline to File Claims. 
Section 501/Bankruptcy Rules 3001/3007.
• Time Deadlines.  Articles 45 & 48. 
• Filing Written Claims.  Article 49.
• Doctrine of Excusable Neglect. • Eliminated in enacted law.
• Unmatured Interest Not Allowed on Unsecured Claims.  Section 
502(b).
• No Unmatured Interest on Claims.  Article 46.
• Obligations of Joint Debtors. 
Section 509(b).
• Rights of Creditors against Joint Debtors.  
 Article 52.
• Creditors’ Meeting.  Section 341. • Creditors Allowed to Attend Creditors’ Meeting.  Article 59.
• Timing of Creditors’ Meeting.  Article 62.
• What Can Occur at Meeting.  Article 61.
• Creditors’ Meeting Governance.  Articles 60, 61, 64.
• Appointment of Creditors’ Committee. 
Section 1102(a).
o Ordinarily holders of 7 largest unsecured claims.
o May be expanded, including to accommodate small business 
creditors with disproportionately large claims.
• Appointment of a Creditors’ Committee 
o No greater than 9 – with one representative of labor claims.  
Article 67.  
o Secured creditors not eligible to vote on any plans at 
creditors’ meetings.  Article 59.
• Powers/Duties of Creditors’ Committee. 
Section 1104(b).
o Oversees/monitors case.
• Powers and Duties of Creditors’ Committee.   
Article 68.
o Supervises management, disposal and distribution of 
debtor’s property.
o Proposes convention of creditors’ meeting.
o Exercises other functions consigned by the creditors’ 
meeting.
• Contents of Plan of Reorganization.  
 Section 1123.
• Contents of Plan.  Article 81.
• Classification of Claims.  Section 1122.
o Claims in same class must be similar.
o Business justification for 
separation of similar claims.
o Convenience claims allowed.
• Classification.  Article 82.
o Separate claim classes, for secured claims, labor claims, 
taxes, and unsecured claims.
o “Small-amount claim subgroup” of unsecured claims 
allowed.
• Voting on Plan.  Section 1126.
o By class.
o More than 1/2 in number of claims voting, and at least 2/3 
in amount of claims voting.
• Voting Requirements.  Article 84.
o By class.
o More than 1/2 in number of creditors present, and more 
than 2/3 in total amount of credits.
• Cramdown.  Section 1129(b).
o Unfair discrimination of similarly situated claims prohibited.
• Cramdown.  Article 87.
o Introduction of concept of unfair discrimination.
• Exclusive Time to File a Plan.   Section 1121.
o 120 days.
o Can be extended to 18 months.
• Time to File a Plan. Article 79.
o 6 months.
o Can be extended for an additional 3 months upon 
“reasonable grounds.”  
Comparison of U.S. Bankruptcy Code and New Chinese Bankruptcy Law




Is an oversecured creditor entitled to collect a bargained-for 
prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor, regardless of the 
penalty’s reasonableness?
This bankruptcy dispute presents a question of first impression 
in the First Circuit concerning a commercial lender’s right 
to receive a bargained-for prepayment penalty from a solvent 
debtor. Following other circuits, the First Circuit held that 
an oversecured creditor is entitled to collect a bargained-for 
prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor, regardless of the 
penalty’s reasonableness.  Gencarelli v. UPS Capital Business 
Credit, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2446883, 48 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 210, 
Bankr. L. Rep.  P 81,006 (1st Cir. 2007).
The debtors conceded liability for the loan balances 
(including accrued interest); those balances have been 
paid in full and are not at issue in this appeal.  However, 
the debtors balked at paying the prepayment penalties. 
Debtor averred that, under the Code, an oversecured 
creditor is entitled to recover such costs only to the extent 
that they are “reasonable. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(b).  He posited 
that the prepayment penalties demanded by creditor were 
unreasonable because they bore no rational relationship 
to the added expense that prepayment might inflict on the 
lender.  Accordingly, the claims should be disallowed.  But 
creditor argued that “a finding that fees, costs, or charges are 
unreasonable under § 506(b) means only that they cannot 
be allowed as a secured claim, and instead must be treated as 
an unsecured claim. The Court agreed with the creditor. 
According to the court,  section 506(b)’s reasonableness 
standard is not relevant to the question of whether an 
oversecured creditor is entitled to collect a contractually-
based prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. It directs 
to section 502 of the Code and to a wealth of case law 
holding that if fees, costs, or other charges are deemed 
unreasonable, an oversecured creditor nonetheless may 
collect them as unsecured debt (subject to the provisions 
of section 502).  Section 506 furnishes a series of  rules for 
determining whether and to what extent a claim is secured 
(and, therefore, entitled to priority), it does not answer 
the materially different question of whether the claim itself 
should be allowed or disallowed.  See 4 Lawrence P. King et 
al., Collier on Bankruptcy § 506.01, at 506-6 (15th ed.2007). 
Rather, the general rules that govern the allowance or 
disallowance of claims are set out in section 502.   For the 
same understanding,  see  Welzel v. Advocate Realty Inv., LLC 
(In re Welzel), 275 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc). 
The court added that once a claim for fees is found to be 
allowable under section 502, it then must be assessed for 
reasonableness under section 506 in order to determine 
its priority.   2007 WL 2446883 *4.  To the extent that the 
contract between the parties calls for unreasonable fees, 
the fees should be bifurcated and the unreasonable portion 
should be treated as an unsecured claim.; Jospeh F. Sanson 
Inv. Co. v. 8 Ltd. (In re 8 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th 
Cir.1986);  United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc. v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y (In re United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc.), 674 F.2d 
134, 138 (2d Cir.1982) (emphasizing, in dictum, that section 
506 speaks only to whether costs can be treated as secured 
claims).
Research References:Bankruptcy Service, L. Ed. § 23:78; 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice (2d ed.) § 43:3; 
Bankruptcy Law Manual 5d §  6:43; West’s Key Number 
Digest, Bankruptcy  2853.20(3), 2853.20(5); 2007 No. 11 
Bankruptcy Service Current Awareness Alert 3.
Ninth Circuit
To issue a preliminary injunction to stay proceedings between 
two nondebtor parties, must a bankruptcy court  balance debtor’s 
likelihood of success in reorganization against the relative hardship 
to the parties?
When, under  11 U.S.C. § 105(a) the section of the Bankruptcy 
Code authorizing the court to enter any order necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 11, a debtor 
applies for a preliminary injunction to stay a proceeding in 
which the debtor is not a party, the bankruptcy court must 
apply the usual preliminary injunction standard, balancing 
debtor’s likelihood of success in reorganization against the 
relative hardship of the parties, as well as considering the 
public interest, if warranted.  In re Excel Innovations, Inc., --
- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2555941 (C.A.9), 48 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 212, 
(9th Cir. 2007).
In the non-bankruptcy context, courts have consistently 
required trial courts deciding preliminary injunction 
motions to balance the moving party’s likelihood of success 
on the merits and the relative hardship of the parties. The 
moving party must show: (1) a strong likelihood of success 
on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to 
plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance 
of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of 
the public interest (in certain cases).  Alternatively, a court 
may grant the injunction if the plaintiff demonstrates either 
a combination of probable success on the merits and the 
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are 
raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. 
In re Excel Innovations, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2555941 *5. 
The majority of circuits that have reviewed injunctions 
staying actions against non-debtors have applied the usual 
preliminary injunction standard.  Am. Imaging Servs. v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.), 963 F.2d 855, 
858 (6th Cir.1992); Piccinin, 788 F.2d at 1008 (4th Cir.1986); 
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. EPA (In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. 
Co.), 805 F.2d 1175, 1188-89 (5th Cir.1986). As the Fifth 
Circuit pointed out in Commonwealth Oil, the traditional 
approach is strongly supported by the legislative history of 
§ 105(a).  805 F.2d at 1188-89. The relevant Senate report 
explained that § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts “all the 
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traditional injunctive powers of a court 
of equity. ”S.REP. NO. 95-989, at 51 
(1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5837. “Stays or injunctions issued 
under these other sections will not be 
automatic upon the commencement of 
the case, but will be granted or issued 
under the usual rules for the issuance of 
injunctions.” Id. (emphasis added).  The 
Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits 
have similarly applied the traditional 
standard with respect to stays that 
are not automatic under § 362(a). 
See NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 
762 F.2d 695, 699 n. 3 (8th Cir.1985) 
(staying NLRB regulatory proceeding 
against debtor); Wedgewood Inv. Fund 
v. Wedgewood Realty Group, Ltd. (In re 
Wedgewood Realty Group, Ltd.), 878 F.2d 
693, 700-01 (3d Cir.1989) (reimposing 
automatic stay); Manville Corp. v. Equity 
Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 68-69 (2d Cir.1986) 
(reversing stay of shareholder action 
seeking to compel debtor to hold an 
annual meeting).
The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has 
expressly held that the moving party 
need not show irreparable harm.  Fisher 
v. Apostolou, 155 F.3d 876, 882 (7th 
Cir.1998); In re L & S Indus., Inc., 989 
F.2d 929, 932 (7th Cir.1993).  The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach rests upon 
the notion that “[w]hen the evidence 
shows that the defendants are engaged 
in ... the act or practices prohibited by 
a statute which provides for injunctive 
relief to prevent such violations, 
irreparable harm to the plaintiffs need 
not be shown.”  In re Chicago, Milwaukee, 
St. Paul and Pac. R.R., 738 F.2d 209, 213 
(7th Cir.1984). 
Research References: Bankruptcy 
Service, L. Ed. §§ 12:714, 12:746 to 
12:753, 12:754 to 12:756, 12:773 to 
12:776; Norton Bankruptcy Law and 
Practice (2d ed.) §§ 4:4, 4:140, 36:4; 
Bankruptcy Law Manual 5d §§ 2:15, 5:3; 
West’s Key Number Digest, Bankruptcy 
2124 to 2126, 2394 to 2396, 2461to 
2463;  2007 No. 11 Bankruptcy Service 
Current Awareness Alert 6.
Second Circuit
For purposes of application of 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 523(a)(4), is there a requirement of  some 
showing of wrongful action?
As a matter of first impression, Second 
Circuit holds that defalcation for 
purposes of application of 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 523(a)(4) requires some showing of 
wrongful action.  Under this discharge 
exception for defalcation while acting in 
fiduciary capacity, defalcation requires 
showing of conscious misbehavior or 
extreme recklessness, akin to showing 
required for scienter in securities law 
context.  In re Hyman, 48 Bankr. Ct. 
Dec. (CRR) 211, 2007 WL 2492789 (2d 
Cir. 2007).  
While the Code generally allows for 
the discharge of debts, significant 
exceptions exist.  .Among them is § 
523(a)(4) excepting from discharge 
any debt “for fraud or defalcation 
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
embezzlement, or larceny.”11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(4).  This exception, like 
most, must be narrowly construed. 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62, 
118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) 
(observing that exceptions to discharge 
“ ‘should be confined to those plainly 
expressed’ ”).  
There has been much debate among 
the circuits over whether a “defalcation” 
under § 523(a)(4) includes all 
misappropriations or failures to account 
or only those that evince some wrongful 
conduct   See Zohlman v. Zoldan, 226 B.R. 
767, 775 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (discussing the 
circuit split).  In  Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511-12 
(2d Cir.1937),  Judge Learned Hand 
wrestled with this problem without 
resolving it.  The Fourth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits hold that an innocent 
mistake can constitute a defalcation. 
In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th 
Cir.2001) ( “[N]egligence or even 
an innocent mistake which results in 
misappropriation or failure to account 
is sufficient.”); In re Hemmeter, 242 
F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.2001) (“Even 
innocent acts of failure to fully account 
for money received in trust will be held 
as non-dischargeable defalcations.”); 
In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th 
Cir.1997) (“Defalcation includes the 
innocent default of a fiduciary who fails 
to account fully for money received.”).
The majority of the Circuits addressing 
this issue, however, require some level 
of wrongful conduct in order to find 
a defalcation under § 523(a)(4).  The 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits 
require a level of fault greater than 
mere negligence.  In re Schwager, 
121 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir.1997) 
(“While defalcation may not require 
actual intent, it does require some 
level of mental culpability. It is clear 
in the Fifth Circuit that a ‘willful 
neglect’ of fiduciary duty constitutes 
a defalcation-essentially a recklessness 
standard.”);  Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 
1375, 1384-85 (7th Cir.1994) (“[A] 
mere negligent breach of a fiduciary 
duty is not a ‘defalcation’ under section 
523(a)(11).”);  In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 
249, 257 (6th Cir.1982) (ruling that 
while “subjective intent to violate a 
known fiduciary duty or bad faith is 
irrelevant,” the misuse of monies as 
the result of negligence or a mistake of 
fact does not constitute defalcation). 
The Tenth Circuit’s standard is not 
entirely clear but at least requires 
“some portion of misconduct.” Compare 
In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 288 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir.1997) (announcing a standard 
requiring that includes “intentional, 
wilful, reckless or negligent” breaches 
of fiduciary duty), with In re Millikan, 
188 Fed.Appx. 699, 702 (10th Cir.2006) 
(unpublished) (declining to identify a 
specific standard but requiring “some 
portion of misconduct” to prove 
defalcation). The First Circuit set the 
highest bar, requiring a showing of 
extreme recklessness, “akin to the level 
of recklessness required for scienter [in 
securities law].” In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 
20 (1st Cir.2002). In so ruling, the First 
Circuit interpreted “defalcation” as 
requiring a degree of fault, “closer to 
fraud, without the necessity of meeting 
a strict specific intent requirement.   Id. 
at 18-19.
In light of this persistent confusion, 
the Second Circuit aligned itself with 
the First Circuit, WL 2492789 *6.  See 
Baylis, 313 F.3d at 20, in holding that 
defalcation under § 523(a)(4) requires 
a showing of conscious misbehavior or 
extreme recklessness-a showing akin 
to the showing required for scienter 
in the securities law context.  The 
Court  believes that these concepts-well 
understood and commonly applied 
in the securities law context-strike the 
proper balance under § 523(a)(4). 
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This standard ensures that the term 
“defalcation” complements but does 
not dilute the other terms of the 
provision-“fraud,” “embezzlement,” 
and “larceny”-all of which require a 
showing of actual wrongful intent.  See 
4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 523.10(1)(a) 
(15th ed. rev.2007) (“ ‘Fraud’ for 
purposes of this exception has 
generally been interpreted as involving 
intentional deceit, rather than implied 
or constructive fraud.”).
Research References: Bankruptcy 
Service, L. Ed. §§ 27:1084, 27:1149, 
27:2117, 27:2124, 27:2139, 27:2144, 
27:2169, 27:2179, 27:2477; Norton 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice (2d ed.) 
§ 47:21;  Bankruptcy Law Manual 5d §§ 
4:36, 4:53; West’s Key Number Digest, 
Bankruptcy  3376 to 3376(5); 2007 
No. 11 Bankruptcy Service Current 
Awareness Alert 5.
Eighth Circuit
Can a debtor in possession secretly bid on 
estate property at a profit to the debtor in 
possession?
The Eighth Circuit rules that debtor 
in possession may not bid on estate 
property, except in a manner consistent 
with its fiduciary duties of good faith, 
fair dealing, and loyalty.  In re Brook 
Valley VII, Joint Venture, 496 F.3d 892, 48 
Bankr.Ct.Dec. 166 (8th Cir. 2007).
For a debtor-in-possession, the “duty of 
loyalty” includes an obligation to refrain 
from self-dealing, to avoid conflicts 
of interests and the appearance of 
impropriety, to treat all parties to the 
case fairly, and to maximize the value 
of the estate. Chapter 7 trustee filed 
adversary complaint against debtors’ 
principals,  seeking to recover for 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by 
principals in connection with estate 
property that they sold while debtors 
were operating as Chapter 11 debtors-
in-possession.  The Court of Appeals 
found debtors’ principals violated 
their fiduciary duties of loyalty while 
debtors were operating as Chapter 
11 debtors-in-possession where, only 
17 days after filing the bankruptcy 
petitions, principals consented to 
the foreclosure sale of debtors’ real 
property, thus implicitly representing 
to the bankruptcy court that they 
believed foreclosure to be in the estates’ 
interests.  Then, instead of making 
efforts to obtain financing on behalf 
of debtors to salvage the property, they 
secretly purchased the properties for 
themselves, through another entity, 
at a price considerably less than the 
properties’ appraised value, and when 
objection was raised, principals misled 
the court about their holdings in the 
entity that purchased the properties. 
Debtors argued the trustee’s adversary 
complaint constituted an impermissible 
collateral attack on the validity of the 
foreclosure sale, as would have fallen 
within scope of the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure governing relief from 
judgment.  Under this Rule, once a sale 
of assets has been approved by a final 
order of the bankruptcy court, it is “a 
judgment that is good as against the 
world, not merely as against parties to the 
proceeding.”  Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., 
LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 732 (8th Cir.2004). 
Under this standard, property rights 
acquired at a foreclosure sale cannot be 
challenged unless the procedural rules 
allow for a collateral attack.   See Fed.
R.Civ.P. 60(b);  Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9024. 
Thus, if the trustee discovers that the 
order permitting a foreclosure sale has 
been obtained wrongfully, Rule 60(b) 
governs his ability to obtain relief from 
the otherwise final judgment.
The Court of Appeals held that Chapter 
7 trustee’s adversary proceeding 
against debtors’ principals and entities 
controlled by them, by which he 
sought to recover for alleged breaches 
of fiduciary duty by principals in 
connection with estate property that 
they sold while debtors were operating 
as Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession, 
did not constitute an impermissible 
collateral attack on the validity of the 
foreclosure sale, as would have fallen 
within scope of the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure.. The trustee did not 
seek to abrogate the final sale but, 
rather, he sought a remedy for the 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, and 
the remedy presumed the continued 
validity of the foreclosure sale itself.
Research References: Bankr. Serv., L 
Ed §§ 37:79 to 37:81, 37:84, 37:125 to 
37:129; Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 2d §§ 
27:2 to 27:4; Bankruptcy Law Manual 
5d §  5:3; West’s Key Number Digest, 
Bankruptcy  3067, 3067.1, 3072 to 
3072(2), 3622; 2007 No. 11 Bankruptcy 
Service Current Awareness Alert 4.
Sixth Circuit
Does debtor’s failure to appeal, or to obtain 
stay pending appeal of, order of bankruptcy 
court approving sale prevent debtor from 
later mounting collateral attack on this 
unappealed sales order? 
Debtor’s failure to appeal, or to obtain 
stay pending appeal of, order of 
bankruptcy court approving sale, to 
malpractice insurer, of debtor’s legal 
malpractice against attorney that he 
had retained to file petition and to 
represent him in bankruptcy prevented 
debtor from later mounting collateral 
attack on this unappealed sales order.  
In re Parker, 499 F.3d 616, Bankr. L. 
Rep.  P 81,003 (6h Cir. 2007).  In other 
words, the debtor can not continue to 
pursue a malpractice claim which the 
bankruptcy had previously sold and the 
debtor did not appeal the order to sale 
or obtain a stay pending appeal.
This case involved a dispute between 
debtor and his bankruptcy counsel for 
malpractice in filing the bankruptcy 
case.  Attorney that had been retained 
by Chapter 7 debtor to file petition and 
to represent debtor in bankruptcy case 
brought adversary proceeding to enjoin 
debtor from pursuing legal malpractice 
claims against him, after these claims 
were purchased in court-approved sale 
by his malpractice insurer. The United 
States Bankruptcy Court granted 
injunctive relief, and debtor appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
injunction against the debtor.  
There is a split in the cases on the effect 
of a parties failure to appeal or obtain 
a stay pending appeal of a bankruptcy 
courts order of sale.  Title 11 U.S.C. § 
363(b) permits a bankruptcy trustee 
to “sell ... property of the estate” 
after notice and hearing.   Once the 
bankruptcy court authorizes the sale of 
property under § 363, that same section 
limits appellate review:
The reversal or modification 
on appeal of an authorization 
under subsection (b) or (c) of 
this section of a sale or lease 
of property does not affect the 
validity of a sale or lease under 
such authorization to an entity 
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that purchased or leased such 
property in good faith, whether 
or not such entity knew of the 
pendency of the appeal, unless 
such authorization and such sale 
or lease were stayed pending 
appeal. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  
By its terms then, “[b]ankruptcy’s 
mootness rule applies when an appellant 
has failed to obtain a stay from an order 
that permits a sale of a  debtor’s assets.” 
In re 55 Park Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 
100 F.3d 1214, 1216 (6th Cir.1996) 
(internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 499 F.3d 616, 621.   What is 
more, it “limits appellate review of a 
consummated sale ...regardless of the 
merits of legal arguments raised against it.” 
In re Made in Detroit, Inc., 414 F.3d 576, 
581 (6th Cir.2005) (emphasis added). 
A majority of circuits construe § 363(m) 
as creating a per se rule automatically 
mooting appeals for failure to obtain a 
stay of the sale at issue.   See In the Matter 
of The Ginther Trusts, 238 F.3d 686, 689 
(5th Cir.2001);  United States v. Salerno, 
932 F.2d 117, 122-123 (2d Cir.1991);  In 
re Stadium Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 845, 
847 (1st Cir.1990);  Matter of Gilchrist, 
891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1990);  In 
re The Charter Co., 829 F.2d 1054, 1056 
(11th Cir.1987);  In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 
997 (7th Cir.1986);  In re Magwood, 785 
F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1986).   
The Third Circuit applies an alternative 
two part approach, finding an appeal 
moot under § 363(m) if the party 
failed to obtain a stay and reviewing 
courts cannot grant effective relief 
without impacting the validity of 
the sale.  Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 
v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 
499 (3d Cir.1998) (rejecting the per 
se rule);  see also Pittsburgh Food & 
Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 
649 (3d Cir.1997) (declining to adopt 
either the per se rule or the two part 
approach).   This court, the Sixth 
Circuit, has yet to decide whether to 
adopt the per se rule preferred by the 
majority of sister circuits.   Because 
the result in the instant case will be 
the same under either formulation, 
the Court again declined to adopt 
one controlling approach. Under the 
majority’s approach, debtor’s failure to 
obtain a stay would doom the appeal; 
the result under the Third Circuit’s 
two-part approach would be the same 
because debtor had failed to obtain a 
stay of the sale and no effective relief 
could be granted without impacting 
the validity of the sale.
Research References: Bankr. Serv., L Ed 
§§ 20:419 to 20:423; Norton Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice (2d ed.) §§ 37:27, 
148:61; Bankruptcy Law Manual 5d §§ 
5:48, 7:6; West’s Key Number Digest, 
Bankruptcy  3079 to 3081, 3776.5(5); 
2007 No. 11 Bankruptcy Service 
Current Awareness Alert 2.
Third Circuit
Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(b), does 
adequate assurance of future performance 
for assumption and assignment require 
assuring performance of an integral, if 
nonmonetary, term of a contract?
The Third Circuit clarifies that adequate 
assurance of future performance for 
assumption and assignment under 
11 U.S.C.A.§ 365(f)(2)(B) includes 
assuring performance of an integral, 
if nonmonetary, term of a contract.  In 
re Fleming Companies, Inc., 499 F.3d 300, 
48 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 188, Bankr. L. Rep.  P 
80,996 (3rd Cir. 2007).
The debtor, Fleming Companies, Inc. 
(Fleming), is a wholesale supplier of 
grocery products to supermarkets. 
Albertson’s, a supermarket chain, 
operates retail grocery stores.   In 
most cases, Albertson’s stores are 
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centers that Albertson’s owns and 
operates.  Albertson’s constructed a 
large distribution facility (the “Tulsa 
Facility”) to supply its stores throughout 
the Midwest.   After operating at only 
60% capacity, however, Albertson’s 
decided to sell the Tulsa Facility.   In 
2002, Fleming purchased the Tulsa 
Facility.  In return, Fleming received 
the warehouse, the inventory in the 
warehouse, and Albertson’s agreement 
to a long-term supply arrangement for 
its Oklahoma  stores.
According to Albertson’s, the Tulsa 
Facility was a key element in the bargain 
between Albertson’s and Fleming.   The 
Tulsa supply agreement emphasized 
the importance of a supply of products 
“from the Tulsa Facility” because the 
Tulsa Facility contained not only many 
of its former employees but also the 
infrastructure created by Albertson’s. 
Fleming and Albertson’s operated under 
the supply agreement for less than one 
year before Fleming filed for bankruptcy 
on April 1, 2003.   Throughout that 
time, Fleming was unable to meet the 
required service levels.  By August 2003, 
Albertson’s stopped ordering grocery 
products from Fleming.  Albertson’s 
switched its source of supply for the 
Oklahoma market from the Tulsa 
Facility to its own warehouse in Fort 
Worth, Texas.
On August 15, 2003, the Bankruptcy 
Court entered an Order approving the 
sale of Fleming’s assets indirectly to 
AWG.  On August 23, 2003, Fleming 
closed the Tulsa Facility.  On September 
3, 2003, Fleming filed a motion to 
assume and assign the Alberton”s 
supply agreement to AWG pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 365.  AWG proposed to 
supply Albertson’s Oklahoma stores 
from AWG’s Oklahoma City distribution 
center.  Albertson’s opposed the motion 
for a variety of reasons, among them that 
AWG’s electronic ordering, billing and 
inventory systems were not compatible 
with Albertson’s and switching to AWG’s 
system would have been costly and 
inefficient for Albertson’s.   According to 
Albertson’s, AWG’s deliberate decision 
not to acquire and retain the Tulsa 
Facility created a real and cognizable 
economic detriment that contravened 
the essence of the contract embodied 
in the term “supply ... from the Tulsa 
Facility.”
The Bankruptcy Court conducted a 
hearing on the motion for assumption 
and assignment  At the hearing, AWG’s 
testified that it was capable of fully 
performing the supply agreement: 
Albertson’s would be able to purchase 
its products from AWG at the same price 
and on the same terms that Albertson’s 
expected to receive from Fleming, 
pursuant to the agreement, including 
freight charges.
The Court of Appeals held that 
assignment was not permitted, where 
material and significant term of 
agreement could not be performed 
by prospective assignee. Provision in 
executory supply agreement, stating 
that Chapter 11 debtor would supply 
wholesale groceries to non-debtor 
grocery retailer “from its Tulsa Facility” 
was “material and significant term” of the 
executory contract, and thus, debtor’s 
rejection of the Tulsa Facility lease 
precluded adequate assurance of future 
performance by prospective assignee, 
as required for assignment of the 
contract.  The non-debtor retailer not 
only bargained for timely delivery and 
agreed-upon prices, it also bargained for 
the benefits of expedience of a trained 
staff, and a proven electronic system 
of record-keeping, which were only 
available “from the Tulsa Facility.”
Research References: Bankruptcy 
Service, L. Ed. §§ 21:518, 21:522, 21:523; 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice (2d 
ed.) § 39:32; Bankruptcy Law Manual 
5d §§ 8:40, 8:41, 8:43, 8:48, 13:28; West’s 
Key Number Digest, Bankruptcy  3105, 
3105.1, 3107, 3110, 3110.1, 3112, 3114;  
2007 No. 10 Bankruptcy Service Current 
Awareness Alert 9.  
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and bankruptcy liquidation firms. 
This provision enhances the justice 
and professional level of bankruptcy 
procedure. For the time being, local 
bankruptcy administrator lists have 
been formed to handle bankruptcy 
cases; bankruptcy administrator has 
become a new profession.
The new Bankruptcy Law changes 
the running mechanism of China’s 
bankruptcy system. In the past, the 
government played the central role 
in bankruptcy procedure. In the new 
Bankruptcy Law, the court shall play the 
central role in bankruptcy procedure 
and other processes. The law requires 
the court to use its discretionary 
power to control the complete 
bankruptcy procedure to secure a 
fair and transparent process, and at 
the same time, without damaging the 
efficiency of market economy. The new 
Bankruptcy Law brings great challenges 
to the courts and they are required to 
make psychological and professional 
preparations to meet the challenge. 
The court system and the judges are 
required to face the current situation 
and adapt to the new changes in trial 
system, professional accomplishment, 
and judicial integrity. 
III. It Encourages Rehabilitating 
Enterprise by Reorganization
Reorganization is an important system 
adopted by the new Bankruptcy Law, 
providing for a court-controlled, 
enterprise rehabilitating  procedure. 
There are large numbers of enterprises 
in China in need of enterprise 
restructuring to survive business 
distress. But due to the lack of legal 
rules in the old bankruptcy law, 
enterprises could not reorganize 
under a legal framework and out of 
court workouts also faced difficulties 
because of lack of legal foundation. 
The new Bankruptcy Law fills this gap 
with its reorganization system and 
also enables future reorganization in 
court and out of court workouts to be 
more standardized, transparent, and 
equitable. Among the 12 chapters of 
the new Bankruptcy Law, chapter 8 
which covers “reorganization” is the 
longest chapter, accounting for one 
fifth of the whole law. The introduction 
of reorganization procedure makes the 
new Bankruptcy Law not just a law of 
market exit, a law of doom, or a law of 
cleaning out poor enterprises, but also 
a law of enterprise survival, revival, and 
turnaround. The key of bankruptcy 
law lies in reorganization. The aim 
of the new Bankruptcy Law is not to 
liquidate enterprise but to allow more 
enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy 
to turnaround. 
The introduction of the reorganization 
system will facilitate the restructuring 
of listed corporations. Bankruptcy 
reorganization enjoys the following 
advantages: First, it is a court 
monitored restructure and enjoys 
mandatory effect. All other litigations 
shall stay upon the court’s acceptance 
of the filing of reorganization. For 
instance, the debt to creditors may be 
suspended, and even the foreclosure 
by the secured creditors also stays. 
Second, it is more market driven. 
There are multiple players entitled to 
filing for reorganization. According to 
the new Bankruptcy Law, not only the 
debtor and the creditors are entitled 
to filing for reorganization, the equity 
holders may also file for reorganization 
under certain conditions. The new 
Bankruptcy Law introduces the DIP 
system, which generally allows the 
incumbent management to continue 
control of the business and may manage 
the business for half a year or longer, 
but they must propose a reorganization 
plan during this period. This plays a 
positive role in facilitating successful 
reorganization. Third, it provides 
multiple reorganization measures. The 
debtor may flexibly adopt the allowed 
measures to achieve its purpose 
of restoring business operation, 
liquidating debt, and rehabilitating 
by restructuring. The debtor may not 
only delay payment of debt or exempt 
or reduce the amount of debt, but also 
transfer its shares without consideration, 
reduce or increase registered capital, 
transform debt into equity, issue new 
shares or corporate bond to specific 
subject, transfer business or assets, etc. 
Besides, the rules of reorganization are 
also multiple and flexible. For instance, 
in case not all the classes unanimously 
pass the reorganization plan with 
legitimate majority vote, as long as 
there is one class passing the vote, 
the bankruptcy administrator, upon 
considering the specific situations of 
the enterprise, may decide to submit 
the reorganization plan to the court for 
a cram down. The cram down, however, 
must be subject to the conditions 
stipulated by article 87 to ensure that 
the vested interests of all the parties are 
not infringed. 
Reorganization procedure adopted 
by the new Bankruptcy Law advocates 
for enterprise rehabilitation, and 
this comports with the ongoing 
industrial restructuring activities of 
some enterprises. Some state owned 
enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy 
expect outside strategic investors 
to solve their huge amount of debt 
through bankruptcy and restructuring 
procedure. The key of bankruptcy 
reorganization is not simply a transfer 
of assets, but the investment and 
development plan of the outside 
investors after they acquire the 
enterprise. 
IV.  It Protects the Creditors’ Interests 
and Reduces the Transaction 
Costs of Bond Issuance
The new Bankruptcy Law benefits the 
protection of creditors’ rights in the 
following aspects: First, the filing party 
of bankruptcy procedure includes both 
creditor and debtor. Once bankruptcy 
proceeding is initiated, the court shall 
not refuse to accept the case without 
justified reason. Second, concerning 
bankruptcy requirements, once the 
debtor enterprise fails to pay its debts as 
they come due or appear to be incapable 
of paying off its debts, the creditors may 
file for bankruptcy and take proper 
measures with the consent of the court. 
Third, it establishes a bankruptcy 
administrator system. Once the debtor 
gets into trouble the creditor may take 
over the enterprise in accordance 
with judicial arrangement. Fourth, it 
sets up a bankruptcy reorganization 
system. When the creditor believes 
the debtor enterprise still has a hope 
of survival it may require the debtor 
to make a plan of reorganization. A 
good reorganization procedure brings 
the creditor more collection value 
than liquidation does. Last, it sets up 
a creditors’ committee and creditors’ 
meeting system. Article 61 vests large 
power to creditors. Article 69 especially 
provides the creditors’ committee may 
supervise the bankruptcy administrator 
on ten types of acts concerning dealing 
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with debtor’s assets.  
The new Bankruptcy Law also solves 
the dispute since 2004 concerning 
whether a secured claim or employee 
claim (wage claims and other 
material benefits claims) has priority 
in liquidation and establishes the 
principal of secured claim priority. This 
principle helps the enterprise to reduce 
the cost of bond issuance. According 
to the old enterprise bankruptcy law, 
the debtor should liquidate employee 
claims first and the deficiency should 
be collected from secured assets. This 
obviously endangers the interests of 
secured creditors. The new Bankruptcy 
Law follows ordinary international 
practice to establish the principle of 
paying off secured claims in priority 
to better secure the rights of bond 
investors, which reduces the demand 
by bond investors from bond issuers 
for a premium caused by potential risk 
of bond claim liquidation. However, 
the priority claims set up in the new 
Bankruptcy Law only refers to secured 
claims to the extent of the value of the 
collateral, and if the secured claims can 
not be fully covered by the collateral, 
the deficiency shall be considered as 
general claims. General claims are 
inferior to employee claims and other 
material benefits claims of employees 
in liquidation.
V.  “Fake Bankruptcy, Real Debt 
Evasion” (Evasion of Debt under 
the Disguise of Bankruptcy) 
Shall be Prosecuted for Criminal 
Liability
It is not unusual that the enterprise goes 
bankrupt while the responsible persons 
slip away with money. A problem which 
has long been a legal gap and attracted 
close attention by practitioners in 
industry is how to avoid management 
benefiting from enterprise bankruptcy 
and further prevent state-owned 
assets from being appropriated by 
management.
In order to eradicate the “fake 
bankruptcy, real debt evasion” problem, 
the new Bankruptcy Law focuses on the 
provisions of stay of procedure and 
the withdrawal and a voidance of acts 
performed prior to bankruptcy. It also 
strengthens the monitoring of “fake 
bankruptcy, real debt evasion” as well 
as bankruptcy liability of management. 
Article 31 provides that the bankruptcy 
administrator may request the court 
to withdraw the following acts related 
the debtor’s assets performed within 
one year before the court accepts the 
bankruptcy filing: transferring assets 
without compensation, performing 
transaction with obviously unreasonable 
price, providing asset security for the 
unsecured debt, paying off undue 
debt, and renouncing claims.  Article 
33 provides that the acts related to the 
debtor’s assets, such as concealing or 
transferring assets or fabricating debt 
or admitting false debt in order to 
evade debt, are void.
 Article 6 explicitly provides: “The 
management of the bankrupt 
enterprise shall be investigated for 
legal responsibility in accordance with 
the law.” Article 125 also stipulates 
that directors, supervisors or officers 
violating their fiduciary duties 
and causing the bankruptcy shall 
bear civil liability. In addition, the 
aforementioned persons are forbidden 
to act as directors, supervisors or 
officers in any enterprises within three 
years after the end of the bankruptcy 
proceeding.
Article 15 explicitly stipulates that from 
the date when the court’s acceptance 
of the bankruptcy filing is served to the 
debtor to the date of the ending of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, the relevant 
persons in the debtor enterprise bear 
the following liabilities: to take good 
care of the assets, seals, accounts or 
documents under his possession and 
management, to work according 
to the requirements of the court 
and bankruptcy administrator and 
truthfully answer enquiries, to sit in the 
creditors’meeting and truthfully answer 
creditors’ inquires; not to leave his 
domicile without the permission of the 
court, and not to get new positions in 
other enterprises as director, supervisor 
or officer.
VI.  Some Defects in the System 
Design of the New Bankruptcy 
Law
There are still some defects in the system 
design of the new Bankruptcy Law. The 
defects in enterprise reorganization 
may affect strategic investors and 
financial investors.
The first deflect is about the aim 
of reorganization. It only stipulates 
rehabilitating reorganization without 
including liquidating reorganization. 
In international practice, the 
reorganization procedure consists of two 
types of procedures. The rehabilitating 
type of reorganization, if without 
success, may be transformed into the 
liquidation type of reorganization  
The second defect lies in the threshold 
of filing for reorganization. Under the 
new Bankruptcy Law both debtor and 
creditor may file for reorganization and 
the provision is too broad and general. 
Creditors should be required to reach a 
certain proportion in number in order 
to be qualified to file reorganization 
and a hearing should be held to justify 
if the reorganization procedure is 
necessary. But the new Bankruptcy Law 
of China requires the court to make 
decision on whether to accept the case 
or not within fifteen days after receiving 
the application. The requirement is too 
high. 
The third defect is the definition of 
debtor in possession. The debtor may 
manage the assets by itself (DIP), but 
the law does not specify whether it is 
operated by the board of directors or 
by the general shareholders meeting.  
The fourth defect is that it does not 
make restrictions on the debtor’s power 
during reorganization. Enterprises in 
reorganization are in an “unsound” 
state and the law should make certain 
restrictions on the DIP by making some 
prohibitive stipulations.
The last defect is that the law does not 
make stipulations about a creditors 
market and claims market. The old 
creditors are only passive parties in the 
reorganization process: we must allow 
active parties, that is new creditors, 
to enter the reorganization process 
in order to better promise success in 
reorganization. Thus there is need for 
markets such as a claims market where 
creditors may sell their claims at a 
discount.  
The author is a professor from China University 
of Political Science and Law and a member of the 
drafting group for the new bankruptcy law
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Blum Shapiro, Connecticut’s largest independent 
accounting & consulting firm is seeking an 
experienced Forensic Accountant for its Litigation 
Services & Business Valuation Group
Work and learn along with our experienced team 
of professionals. Assignments include fraud 
investigations, forensic accounting, bankruptcy 
and expert testimony. 
The ideal candidate should have 3-6 years of 
combined general and forensic accounting 
experience.  Tax experience helpful. CPA preferred.
Blum Shapiro offers a competitive salary along 
with a generous benefit package.  E-mail your 
resumeand/or letter along with salary requirements 
in confidence to careers@blumshapiro.com or fax 
to 860-521-9241 or
Blum, Shapiro & Co., P.C.
Human Resources –PRF1
29 South Main Street, Box 272000
West Hartford, CT 06127-2000
EOE
JOB POSTING
KURTZMAN CARSON CONSULTANTS appoints finan-
cial professional Jon Orr as Chief Financial officer 
EL SEGUNDO, August 27, 2007 – Kurtzman Carson Con-
sultants (KCC), a provider of administrative-support so-
lutions for the legal and financial industries, appointed 
Jon A. Orr as chief financial officer (CFO) to lead the com-
pany’s financial operations.  In this role, Mr. Orr oversees 
the firm’s financial planning and analysis, in addition to 
the management of accounting, treasury and financial 
reporting functions for the company.  
“Jon’s high-level experience in corporate finance, comple-
mented by his in-depth understanding of the restructur-
ing and transactional issues facing our clients, makes him 
a natural fit as the CFO of KCC,” said Eric Kurtzman, KCC’s 
CEO and co-founder.  “His financial expertise represents a 
strong addition to KCC’s executive committee and we are 
delighted to have him join the team.” 
Prior to joining KCC, Mr. Orr served as managing director 
of FTI Consulting’s Corporate Finance and Restructuring 
practice where he consulted with clients in numerous fi-
nancial matters involving corporate finance, business re-
structuring, and transaction advisory issues.  Previously, 
he worked for AlixPartners in its Business Turnaround 
Services practice and PricewaterhouseCoopers in its 
Business Restructuring Services and Tax practices.  
Mr. Orr is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and Certi-
fied Insolvency and Restructuring Advisor (CIRA).  He is 
a member of the Association of Insolvency and Restruc-
turing Advisors (AIRA) and the Turnaround Management 
Association (TMA).  He holds a Bachelor of Science in 
Business Administration degree in Finance and Account-
ing from Creighton University in Omaha, Neb.  
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FTI Consulting Inc 68
Alvarez & Marsal LLC 51
AlixPartners, LLP 43
Kroll Zolfo Cooper LLC 37
Deloitte. 32
Mesirow Financial Consulting LLC 27
Grant Thornton LLP 23
Huron Consulting Group LLC 19
Navigant Capital Advisors LLC 18
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Protiviti Inc 12
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